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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN
REPRESENTING HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATIONS
John M. Burman*
Representing physicians or other health care workers (physicians and other
individual health care practitioners are referred to collectively as “HCWs”),
medical organizations, physicians’ organizations, is not particularly unique. The
same ethical standards apply that generally apply to lawyers who represent clients.
As with any group or type of clients, however, there can be a few differences.
Perhaps the main one in this area, however, is that the medical profession is itself,
unique, subject to myriad federal and state laws that govern the payment and
receipt of government funds for HCWs and organizations that provide health care
services, as well as laws about virtually every aspect of the health care system. That
uniqueness presents some different challenges for those lawyers who represent
HCWs, health care organizations, or both.
Among the many ethical issues facing lawyers who represent HCWs is that
many HCWs, or the associations or institutions for which the lawyers work,
are governmental entities, or private entities that receive federal money, state
money, or both. Accordingly, the ethical issues faced by the lawyers who represent
such clients are the issues faced by government lawyers (or, more accurately,
lawyers who represent government entities), in general. The other major
category of ethical issues involves lawyers who represent any type or organization
or entity, governmental or private. Those two categories of issues are the focus of
this article.
This article is intended to provide a general overview of a lawyer’s ethical
duties when the lawyer represents either an individual HCW or a health care
* John M. Burman is a Professor of Law at the University of Wyoming. He spent nearly twentyﬁve years representing the Medicaid programs in two different states, where he was involved in the
creation and implementation of reimbursement systems for individual and organizational providers
of health care services, and representing states in controversies with the federal government about
Medicaid funds. The author thanks Denise Burke, who read and commented on a draft of this
article. Her comments were helpful.
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organization. As so many HCWs and health care organizations are governmental,
part I addresses the differences between private and government lawyers. Part
II considers a lawyer’s obligations when that lawyer represents an organization,
including: (1) who is the client and with whom should the lawyer interact when
representing the client? (2) general ethical considerations when representing a
health care organization; (3) explaining how a lawyer’s duty of conﬁdentiality
and the attorney-client privilege apply when the client is an organization; (4) a
lawyer’s obligation to blow the whistle to protect an organization; and (5) a brief
description of the additional requirements imposed by Congress on health care
lawyers and HCWs or health care organizations that receive government funds.

I. GOVERNMENT LAWYERS ARE DIFFERENT
Any discussion of how the Rules of Professional Conduct (“the Rules”) apply
to government lawyers,1 begins with the cardinal concept that all lawyers are
subject to the Rules, even when they act at the direction of another person.2
The Rules do, however, anticipate that government lawyers, especially full-time
government lawyers, will play a somewhat different role than lawyers in private
practice, and their ethical obligations, therefore, are a bit different.
An analysis of a lawyer’s ethical obligations begins with the Preamble and
Scope of the Rules, as: “[t]he Preamble and this note on Scope provide general
orientation [to the Rules].”3 The note on Scope also makes it clear that sources
other than the Rules may affect government lawyers’ ethical obligations (the Rules
do not generally expressly distinguish between full and part-time government
lawyers; that distinction is the author’s): “Under various legal provisions, including
constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government
lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in
the client in private client-lawyer relationships.”4
The Scope continues by illustrating how a government lawyer’s role may
differ:
For example, a lawyer for a government agency may have
authority on behalf of the government to decide upon settlement
or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority
in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general
and the state’s attorney in state government, and their federal
1

See infra note 79-223 and accompanying text.

2

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rs. 5.2(a) and 8.5(a) (2006); see also, DISCIPLINARY CODE
WYO. STATE BAR Preamble, § 1(a) (2006) (“Any attorney [in Wyoming] is subject to the
exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court and the Board of Professional Responsibility.”).
FOR THE

3

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope [20] (2006).

4

Id. at Scope [17].
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counterparts, and the same may be true of other government
law ofﬁcers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these ofﬁcers
may be authorized to represent several government agencies in
intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a
private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. These
Rules do not abrogate any such authority.5
The reference to “a lawyer for a government agency” does not indicate whether
the reference is to full-time government lawyers, part-time government lawyers,
or both. Given the general structure of the Rules and applicable substantive law,
however, it appears that the question should not be simply whether one is a full or
part-time government lawyer, but rather the key is the role the lawyer is playing,
i.e., does the lawyer represent a government agency. As a practical matter, however,
a part-time government lawyer may feel that he or she has less “power” than a
full-time one.

A. Differences in the Rules.
While all lawyers are bound by the Rules, the Rules treat government lawyers
differently in a couple respects. The most important difference applies to full-time
government lawyers.
The Rules treat conﬂicts of interest involving former clients of full-time
government lawyers differently. Generally, conﬂicts of interest regarding former
clients are addressed in Rule 1.9, “Duties to former clients.”6 Under that Rule,
lawyers owe duties of loyalty when they switch ﬁrms7 and a duty of conﬁdentiality
to former clients and former clients of the lawyer’s former or current ﬁrm.8 The
duty of loyalty when a lawyer switches employment is more ﬂexible for former
full-time government lawyers who move to private practice, than for lawyers in
private practice who switch private ﬁrms.

1. Rule 1.11: “Special Conﬂicts of Interest for Former and Current
Government Ofﬁcers and Employees.”
Rule 1.11 is entitled “Special conﬂicts of interest for former and current
government ofﬁcers and employees.” As the title suggests, it contains different
conﬂict of interest standards for full-time government lawyers.

5

Id. at Scope [4] (emphasis added).

6

See Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo. 1988) (the Wyoming Supreme Court
applied Rule 1.9 to lawyers in private practice).
7

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(b) (2006).

8

Id. at R. 1.9(c).
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First, Rule 1.11 makes it clear that the rule applies to a lawyer who “has formerly
served as a public ofﬁcer or employee of the government.”9 The Rule applies, in
other words to former full-time government lawyers.10 As Rule 1.9 does with
respect to non-governmental lawyers, Rule 1.11 creates duties of conﬁdentiality
and loyalty to former clients. The duty of conﬁdentiality is the same. Lawyers who
were formerly “public ofﬁcer[s] or employee[s] of the government” are “subject to
Rule 1.9(c) [which prohibits lawyers from using or revealing information about
former clients in most circumstances].”11
Second, the Rule creates, and limits, full-time government lawyers’ duty of
loyalty to former clients. The general rule is that “[a] lawyer who has formerly served
as a public ofﬁcer or employee . . . shall not . . . represent a client in connection
with a matter12 in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially
as a public ofﬁcer or employee . . . .”13 The Rule creates the typical exception
for waiver of a conﬂict when a lawyer was involved in a matter “personally and
substantially.” A lawyer may represent a client with interests adverse to the former
client if “the appropriate government agency makes an informed decision14 [to
allow the representation], conﬁrmed in writing.”15
The big difference between the Rules’ treatment of full-time government
lawyers and other lawyers is in the imputation of conﬂicts. As a general matter,

9

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11(a) (2006).

10

Though the Rule and the comments do not use the term “full-time,” it seems clear from
the use of the words “public ofﬁcer or employee . . .” that the Rule applies to full-time government
lawyers, not employees of a private ﬁrm that represent government entities. See id. R. 1.11 cmt.
[2].
11

Id. at R. 1.11(a)(1).

12

“Matter” means, for purposes of Rule 1.11, “any judicial or other proceeding, application,
request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge,
accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a speciﬁc party or parties . . .” Id. at
R. 1.11(e)(1). It includes “any other matter covered by the conﬂict of interest rules of the appropriate
government agency.” Id. at R. 1.11(e)(2).
13

Id. at R. 1.11(a)(2).

14

“Informed decision” means “the decision by a person to a proposed course of conduct after
the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of
and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” WYO. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.0(f ) (2006).
15

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11(a)(2) (2006). “Conﬁrmed in writing” means
an informed decision that is given in writing by the person or a writing that a lawyer
promptly transmits to the person conﬁrming the oral informed decision. . . If it
is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person makes an
informed decision, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable
time thereafter.

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(c) (2006).
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“[w]hile lawyers are associated in a ﬁrm,16 none of them shall knowingly represent
a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing
so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9 . . .”17 Signiﬁcantly, the Rule on imputing conﬂicts of
interest refers only to “Rules 1.7 or 1.9,” not to Rule 1.11, the Rule which applies
to current or former full-time government lawyers. It is clear, therefore, that the
Rules treat full-time government lawyers differently when it comes to imputing
conﬂicts of interest.
The difference is that even when a former full-time government lawyer is
disqualiﬁed under Rule 1.11 because he or she “participated personally and
substantially,”18 the lawyer’s new private ﬁrm is not precluded from involvement
in the matter, as it would be under Rule 1.9(b), if certain conditions are met.
First, the disqualiﬁed lawyer must be “timely screened19 from any participation
in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.”20 Screening is not
permitted under Rule 1.9(b) with respect to lawyers who switch between private
ﬁrms. The new ﬁrm will be disqualiﬁed if the lawyer switching ﬁrms “acquired
information” protected by Rule 1.6 (the Rule which generally prohibits a lawyer
from revealing “conﬁdential information”21 about a client) that is “material to the
matter . . .”22
Second, “written notice [must be] promptly given to the appropriate
government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of
this rule.”23 The phrase “to enable it [the government agency] to ascertain
compliance with the provisions of this rule [Rule 1.11],” is to allow “the
government agency [to] have a reasonable opportunity to ascertain that the lawyer
16
“Firm” means “a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole
proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services
organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.” Id. at R. 1.0(d). The
reference to “the legal department of . . . [an] organization” includes a government law ofﬁce. See
id. at R. 1.0 cmt. [3].
17

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (2006).

18

Id. at R. 1.11(a)(2).

19

“Screened” means “the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the
timely imposition of procedures within a ﬁrm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances
to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other
law.” Id. at R. 1.0(l). “The purpose of screening is to assure the affected parties that conﬁdential
information known by the personally disqualiﬁed lawyer remains protected.” Id. at R. 1.0 cmt.
[8]. Screening may include “denial of access by the screened lawyer to ﬁrm ﬁles or other materials
relating to the matter and periodic reminders of the screen to the screened lawyer and all other ﬁrm
personnel.” Id.
20

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. at R. 1.11(b)(1) (2006).

21

“Conﬁdential information” means “information provided by the client or relating to the
client which is not otherwise available to the public.” WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(b)
(2006).
22

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(b)(2) (2006).

23

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11(b)(2) (2006).
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is complying with Rule 1.11 and to take appropriate action if it believes the lawyer
is not complying.”24
Paragraph (c) of Rule 1.11 addresses another conﬂict of interest issue
regarding government lawyers (whether full or part-time), and, once again, treats
them differently than lawyers in private practice. The issue is a former full-time
lawyer who obtained “conﬁdential government information.”25
If a lawyer has obtained “conﬁdential government information,” while “the
lawyer was a public ofﬁcer or [government] employee” and “knows”26 it, the lawyer
“may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in
a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of
that person . . . .”27 Once again, however, the disqualiﬁcation of an individual
lawyer is not necessarily imputed to the new ﬁrm. “A ﬁrm with which that lawyer
is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the
disqualiﬁed lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is
apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.”28
The restriction on using “conﬁdential government information” to the
“material disadvantage” of the person identiﬁed in the information is particularly
important when medical records or information are involved (it will be common
for full-time government lawyers who represent medical institutions to have access
to such information as “public records” is deﬁned very broadly, but the deﬁnition
excludes those records “privileged or conﬁdential by law.”29) Among those
“privileged or conﬁdential” records to which the custodian “shall deny the right
of inspection”30 are “[m]edical, psychological and sociological data on individual
persons . . . .”31 In other words, a government lawyer, either full or part-time,
who obtains medical records that identify an individual or individuals may not
subsequently use that information, after he or she is no longer a government
lawyer, to the “material disadvantage” of person so identiﬁed.32

24

Id. at R. 1.11 cmt. [8].

25

Id. at R. 1.11(c). As used in this rule “conﬁdential government information” means “information that has been obtained under governmental authority and which, at the time this Rule is
applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege
not to disclose and which is not otherwise available to the public.” Id.
26

“Knows” means “actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be
inferred from circumstances.” WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(g) (2006).
27

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11(c) (2006).

28

Id. at R. 1.11(c).

29

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-201(a)(v) (2006).

30

Id. at § 16-4-203(d).

31

Id. at § 16-4-203(d)(i).

32

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11(c) (2006).
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The reason that the restriction should apply to both full and part-time
government lawyers is that the danger to be avoided, using conﬁdential government
information to the “material disadvantage” of a person or persons identiﬁed in the
records, exists whenever a lawyer has access to such information, regardless of
whether the lawyer is a full-time or a part-time government lawyer. And given the
reality that many lawyers who represent government HCWs and the institutions
in which they work are private attorneys, such as a private ﬁrm that represents a
county or county memorial hospital,33 it is critical that the prohibition be applied
to any lawyer with access to such conﬁdential information.
Paragraph (d) of Rule 1.11 addresses the conﬂicts that may arise when a lawyer
moves from private practice to work as a “public ofﬁcer or employee,” conﬂicts,
that is, for current government lawyers. Once again, the Rule does not specify
whether it applies to full-time or part-time government employees. Given the use
of the term “public ofﬁcer or employee,” it could be argued that the provision
applies to full-time government employees only as lawyers in private practice are
not “employees” of a governmental entity. Nevertheless, given the harm to be
avoided, the use of conﬁdential information gained in previous employment, the
Rule should apply to both full-time and part-time lawyers as a current government
lawyer, whether full-time or part-time, should not be able to use information
against a previous client.34
The general rule is that a lawyer who has moved from private practice to
government practice is subject to the general conﬂict of interest provisions of Rule
1.7 (concurrent conﬂicts of interest) and Rule 1.9 (conﬂicts involving former
clients).35 In addition to complying with those Rules, the current government
lawyer “shall not participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially while in private practice . . . unless the appropriate government
agency makes an informed decision to allow the representation, conﬁrmed
in writing.”36
It appears counter-intuitive, at ﬁrst blush, that a “government agency,”
presumably the agency for which the lawyer now works or represents, and which
33

“County hospitals” and “county memorial hospitals” are regulated by WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18-8-101 et seq. (2006).
34

See Lisa G. Lerman, Public Service by Public Servants, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1141, 1162

(1991)
The case law addressing who is the client of the government attorney for the
purpose of determining conﬂicts of interest involves mainly part-time state or local
government lawyers, and most of the cases involve conﬂicts with compensated
private practice. . . . The courts tend to examine each situation to determine whether
the government lawyer in question has an actual or an apparent conﬂict of interest.
Id.
35

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11(d)(1) (2006).

36

Id. at R. 1.11(d)(2)(i).
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is, therefore, the current client, and not the lawyer’s former client, should be
allowed to waive such a conﬂict. The interests of the former client are protected,
however, by the Rule’s earlier inclusion of Rule 1.9, the Rule which sets out
lawyers’ duties to former clients.37 Rule 1.9 “would require the former client’s
consent [“informed decision” is the term used in Wyoming’s Rules]”.38
The Rule also limits a government lawyer’s (a full-time government lawyer’s)
ability to “negotiate for private employment” while a government employee.39 A
“public ofﬁcer or [government] employee . . . shall not . . . negotiate for private
employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party
in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially . . .”40
(There is an exception for lawyers working as law clerks.)41

2. Rule 1.13: “Organization as Client”
One of the more troublesome realities of virtually all forms of government
practice, and most forms of private practice, is that many clients today are
organizations of some sort, not individuals. The difﬁculty is that the ABA’s
Model Rules, and the Wyoming Rules which are based on them, is that they
were developed, for the most part, to accommodate an individual lawyer, or a
member of a small ﬁrm, who represents individuals. The reality, today, is that
many lawyers are part of a ﬁrm, whether private or governmental, and many of
their clients are organizations, either private or governmental, large or small, or
for proﬁt or not-for-proﬁt. A lawyer’s duties do not change when the lawyer’s
client is an organization, but applying the rules to organizations, including the
government, can be a challenge. Just identifying the client can be difﬁcult when
it is a collection of individuals. Applying conﬁdentiality concepts and conﬂict of
interest standards to organizations can be equally difﬁcult.
Most HCWs work in some sort of group, or for some sort of institution, either
private or governmental. Accordingly, the lawyers who represent those groups or
institutions must be aware of how their duties are applied in an organizational
setting. In addition, many groups or institutions are governmental organizations,
presenting some additional challenges to the lawyers who represent them.

37

ABA ANN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, 205 (5th ed. 2003).

38

See, e.g., WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) & (b)(2) (2006) “Informed decision”
means “the decision by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives
to the proposed course of conduct.” Id. at R. 1.0(f ).
39

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11(d)(2)(ii) (2006).

40

Id.

41

Id.
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Rule 1.13 is the only Rule that expressly addresses organizations as clients.
It generally applies to all organizations, but does anticipate that government
lawyers may play a slightly different role. While the language of the Rule does
not distinguish between governmental and private organizations, the commentary42 does.
Comment [7] is entitled “Government Agency.” It makes several important
points. First, “[t]he duty deﬁned in this Rule applies to governmental
organizations.”43 Second, the comment warns that “[d]eﬁning precisely the
identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers
may be more difﬁcult in the government context and is a matter beyond the
scope of these Rules.44 Third, when it comes to identifying the client, “in some
circumstances the client may be a speciﬁc agency, [but] it may also be a branch
of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole.”
(Perhaps the best way to determine who is the client is for a lawyer to consider
from whom he or she takes directions. An assistant attorney general for the State of
Wyoming is unlikely, for example, to take directions from the Governor. Rather,
an agency head, or even a lower ranking ofﬁcial, is likely the person. That agency,
therefore, and not the entire state government, is the client. By contrast, a city
attorney generally takes direction from the City Council. The client, therefore, is
the entire city.) Finally, the comment notes that:
[I]n a matter involving the conduct of government ofﬁcials, a
government lawyer may have authority under applicable law to
question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for
a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the
client is a governmental organization, a different balance may
be appropriate between maintaining conﬁdentiality and assuring
that the wrongful act is prevented or rectiﬁed, for public business
is involved.45
Comment [7] appears to apply to both full-time and part-time government
lawyers, as both may face the issues raised. Furthermore, misconduct by a
government ofﬁcial can occur at any level, and the evil to be avoided is the same,
regardless of whether the lawyer for the government organization is a full-time

42
The Commentary to each Rule “explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the
Rule” Id. at Scope [20].
43

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. [7] (2006).

44

Id; see WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. at Scope [16] (2006) (noting that “for purposes of
determining the lawyer’s authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these
Rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists”).
45

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. [7] (2006).
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or part-time lawyer. A lawyer’s general obligations to an organizational client are
discussed in detail below.46
The Rules “presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role.”47
Accordingly, “[u]nder various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory
and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority
concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client. . . .”48 It is important,
therefore, for government lawyers who represent HCWs or institutions in which
HCWs work, to know if statutes impose certain obligations on them.

B. Statutory Duties
1. The Wyoming Attorney General
Not surprisingly, different statutes apply to different levels of government
and different types of representation, including the representation of HCWs,
institutions in which they work, or both. While there are numerous HCWs who
work for federal institutions, the duties of the lawyers who represent them are
beyond the scope of this article. Rather, this article focuses on Wyoming State
Government, and its subdivisions.
By statute, the Wyoming Attorney General has several responsibilities. First,
he or she is “to [p]rosecute and defend all suits instituted by or against the state
of Wyoming, the prosecution and defense of which is not otherwise provided for
by law;”49 Second, the Attorney General is to “[d]efend suits brought against state
ofﬁcers in their ofﬁcial relations, . . .”50 Third, the Attorney General is to “[b]e
the legal adviser of all elective and appointive state ofﬁcers and of the county
and district attorneys of the state.”51 Fourth, “[w]hen requested, [the Attorney
General shall] give written opinions upon questions submitted to him by elective
and appointive state ofﬁcers . . .”52 Fifth, the Attorney General is to “[a]pprove or
disapprove any contract submitted to him for review . . .”53 Finally, the Attorney
General is to be involved in rulemaking by agencies, including the Departments of
Health and Correction, both of which operate health care institutions or provide
health care services. As part of that involvement, notice of proposed rulemaking is

46

See infra notes 99 –109 and accompanying text.

47

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope [15] (2006).

48

Id. at Scope [17].

49

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603(a)(i) (2008).

50

Id. at § 9-1-603(a)(iii).

51

Id. at § 9-1-603(a)(v).

52

Id. at § 9-1-603(a)(vi).

53

Id. at § 9-1-603(a)(viii).
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to be given to the Attorney General.54 In addition to receiving notice of proposed
rulemaking, the Attorney General “shall furnish advice and assistance to all state
agencies in the preparation of their regulations, and in revising, codifying and
editing existing or new regulations.”55 A party to a lawsuit, an individual seeking
advice or an opinion, a party to a contract, or an agency that wishes to promulgate
rules, may well be the Director of the Department of Health56 or the Directors
subordinates, some of which administer HCWs or the institutions in which
HCWs work.
The Wyoming Department of Corrections also maintains several institutions,
such as the Wyoming State Penitentiary, the Wyoming women’s center, the boys’
school, the girls’ school, the Wyoming retirement center, and the Wyoming state
hospital.57 Inmates at those, and other correctional institutions, have a right to
adequate medical treatment.58

2. Attorneys for County Hospitals, County Memorial Hospitals, or
Special Hospital Districts.
Most hospitals in Wyoming are public, either county hospitals, county
memorial hospitals, or hospitals in special hospital districts (A “rural health care
district” may also be established). The lawyers who represent them are generally
part-time government lawyers, lawyers in private practice for whom the hospital
or hospital district is one of the ﬁrm’s clients. Since county hospitals, county
memorial hospitals, and hospitals in special hospital districts exist by virtue of
statutes, it is important to know what those statues say.

54

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-103(a)(i) (2008).

55

Id. at § 16-3-104(d).

56

The Director of the Department of Health has broad powers. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-102
(2008). They are, inter alia, “the state mental health authority, the developmental disabilities
authority and the substance abuse authority,” with broad powers in those health ﬁelds. Id. at
§ 9-2-102(a). Among other things, the Department of Health is to “[p]rovide a coordinated network
of programs and facilities offering the following services to persons afﬂicted with mental illness or
developmental disabilities or for substance abuse: diagnosis, treatment, education, care, training,
community living, habilitation and rehabilitation.” Id. at § 9-2-102(a)(ii). The Department’s
powers include promulgating administrative rules. Id. at § 9-2-106(a)(iii); see also WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-4-104(a)(iv) (2008) (“The department of health shall . . . [a]dopt, amend and rescind rules and
regulations on the administration of [the Medical Services Act] . . .”).
57

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-201(a) (2008).

58

See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (Under the Eighth Amendment,
“ofﬁcials . . . must provide humane conditions of conﬁnement; prison ofﬁcials must ensure that
inmates receive adequate . . . medical care . . .”). The Department of Corrections may provide such
medical services through contracts through private service providers. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-105
(c)(iv) (2008). The department is also to “adopt rules and regulations necessary to carry out its
functions.” Id. at § 25-1-105(a).
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County hospitals and county memorial hospitals are governed by Chapter 8
of Title 18 of the Wyoming statutes (Title 18 is entitled “Counties,” and sets forth
provisions regarding counties, which are subdivisions of the State of Wyoming,
which have only those powers delegated to them by the State Legislature.59)
A “[c]ounty hospital and a county memorial hospital” is “any institution,
place, building or agency in which any accommodation is maintained, furnished
or offered for the hospitalization of the sick, injured . . . .”60 It is to be governed by a
“board of trustees” appointed by the county commissioners.61 Upon appointment
and compliance with the statute, the board of trustees “is a body corporate with
power to sue and be sued. . . . .”62 Among its (the board’s) powers, are the “erection,
management and control” of a hospital.63
As a “body corporate” governed by a “board of trustees,” a county hospital
or county memorial hospital qualiﬁes as a governmental organization, and the
duties of a lawyer who represents an organization, whether public or private, are
discussed in detail below.64
Chapter 2 of Title 35 allows for the creation of “special hospital districts,”
and “special rural health care districts.” 66 Either a “special hospital district” 67
or a “special rural health care district” 68 is a “body corporate,” governed by an
elected “board of trustees.”69 Once again, either a “special hospital district” or a
“special rural health care district” is a governmental organization, and the duties
of a lawyer who represents an organization are discussed below.70
65

In addition to the various governmental organizations that employ HCWs,
there are myriad private organizations that do, too. An organization of HCWs
may take the form of a partnership,71 P.C. (professional corporation),72 limited
59

See, e.g., Board of County Com’rs of Teton County v. Crow, 65 P.3d 720, 724 (Wyo.

2003).
60

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-101(a)(i) (2008).

61

Id. at § 18-8-104(a).

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

See infra notes 85–143 and accompanying text.

65

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-2-401(d) (2008);

66

Id. at § 35-2-701(e).

67

Id. at § 35-2-401(d).

68

Id. at § 35-2-701(e).

69

See id. at § 35-2-404 (“special hospital district”) and id. at § 35-2-704 (“special rural health
care districts”).
70

See infra notes 85–143 and accompanying text.

71

See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-21-101 through 1105 (2008).

72

See id. at §§ 17-3-101–104.
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liability company,73 or some other form. Any of these associations of HCWs are
organizations for purposes of determining lawyers’ obligations, which obligations
are discussed below.74

C. Wyoming Supreme Court
While the Wyoming Supreme Court has, as the Rules, generally held
governmental and non-governmental lawyers to the same standards, there are
some differences. When it comes to conﬂicts of interest, the court has applied
different standards, and it is important for lawyers, whether governmental or in
private practice, to be aware of the difference. The difference which is important
for lawyers who represent HCWs or the institutions in which they work is found
in the court’s opinion in State v. Asch.75 While that case was a criminal one, its
analysis of how conﬂicts of interest should be addressed in the context of full-time
government lawyers who work for a single entity (the Wyoming Public Defender’s
Ofﬁce, in that case), is relevant to how conﬂicts might be addressed when the
lawyers involved are full-time government lawyers, such as the members of the
Wyoming Attorney General’s Ofﬁce, who represent government HCWs or the
State institutions in which they work.
The primary issue in Asch was whether it was permissible for two lawyers
from the Casper ofﬁce of the Wyoming State Public Defender to represent, even
brieﬂy, two individuals (one of whom was David Asch) who were charged with
(different) crimes arising out of the same set of facts.76 One was appointed counsel
from the Casper Ofﬁce of the Wyoming Public Defender. The other, Asch, was
appointed an attorney who was not part of that ofﬁce, but was on contract with
the Public Defender’s Ofﬁce.
For whatever reason, the second attorney was not able to appear at Asch’s
initial hearing, in county (now circuit) court. In her stead, another attorney from
the Casper Ofﬁce of the Wyoming Public Defender appeared on behalf of Asch.
Since the attorney who appeared on behalf of Asch at the initial appearance was
“associated in” the practice of law with the attorney for the other person charged
with a crime arising out of the same trafﬁc stop, the question became whether an
improper conﬂict of interest had arisen (the reason for the question is that the

73

See id. at §§ 17-15-101 through 147.

74

See infra notes 85–143 and accompanying text.

75

State v. Asch, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003). The court has also established a more ﬂexible conﬂicts
of interest standard for full-time government lawyers who switch sides, e.g., from the defense to the
prosecution of a criminal defendant. See State v. Hart, 62 P.3d 566, 573 (Wyo. 2003); Johnson v.
State, 61 P.3d 1234 (Wyo. 2003). It seems unlikely that a full-time government lawyer would switch
sides in the health care context, so those decisions are not discussed in this article.
76

This, and the following paragraph, is based on Asch, 62 P.3d at 948-49.
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conﬂicts of one attorney are generally imputed77 to the rest of the ﬁrm78 and the
Wyoming Supreme Court has held that allowing a lawyer to represent multiple
defendants in a criminal case is reversible error.79)
In Asch, the court concluded that although the Wyoming Public Defender’s
Ofﬁce is a “ﬁrm” within the meaning of the conﬂict of interest rules, those rules
should be applied on a case-by-case basis, and not result in per se disqualiﬁcation
of the State Public Defender’s Ofﬁce.80
It seems reasonably likely that the court would use the same standard with
respect to other government “ﬁrms,” such as the Attorney General’s Ofﬁce.
As those ﬁrms may be involved in representing HCWs or the institutions
in which they work, the more ﬂexible standard for conﬂicts of interest may well
be applicable.

II. ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN REPRESENTING
AN ORGANIZATION81
A. The Proliferation of Health Care Organizations
Most HCWs work for or as part of an organization, though there are still
some sole practitioners around. Accordingly, as with the majority of a lawyer’s
other clients, most of today’s health lawyers’ clients are organizations of some sort,
not individuals. As mentioned earlier, the Rules refer generally contemplate clients
as individuals, leaving unanswered many ethical questions which inevitably arise
when a lawyer represents an organization. With one notable exception, Rule 1.13,
the Rules do not directly address how a lawyer’s duties and responsibilities change
when the client is an organization.

77

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (2006). The Rule in effect now is substantially
similar. The difference is that the current rule contains the following phrase: “unless the prohibition
is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a signiﬁcant risk of
materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the ﬁrm.” Id. at
R. 1.10(a).
78
A “ﬁrm” was deﬁned as “a lawyer or lawyers in a private ﬁrm, the legal department of
a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a legal services organization. See
Comment, Rule 1.10.” WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Terminology (c) (2006). The current
deﬁnition is: “a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship
or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization
or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.” WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.0(d) (2006). Much of the comment to Rule 1.10, to which the old Terminology section
referred, is now found in Comment [2] to Rule 1.0.
79

Shongutsie v. Wyoming, 827 P.2d 361, 367 (Wyo. 1992).

80

Asch, 62 P.3d at 953, 952 n.3.

81

The following section of this article is based, in part, on John M. Burman, Ethical
Considerations When Representing Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 581, 612-630 (2003).
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Health care organizations come in all shapes and sizes. Some are private, others
are governmental. Among private organizations, some are for proﬁt, ranging from
two HCWs to large, national chains, such as nursing-homes. Others are notfor-proﬁt; they too may be small or large. Government health care organizations
have proliferated. Thousands of HCWs now work in dozens of them. Collectively,
they now play a signiﬁcant role, and often a dominant one, such as with public
hospitals, and virtually all HCWs and health care organizations receive federal
funds, state funds, or both, and must, therefore, comply with applicable laws.
Accordingly, a lawyer must know either how to ethically represent the government,
its employees, or both, or how to ethically represent clients with interests adverse
to the governments.
Not surprisingly, the development and proliferation of health care organizations
and other organizational clients has signiﬁcantly altered lawyers’ ethical and legal
obligations in several important ways. First, questions which are simple when
a client is an individual, become complex when the client is an organization.
When a client is an individual, for example, the lawyer knows who the client is
and with whom the lawyer should interact—the individual. But that question
becomes difﬁcult when the client is an organization, which is a legal entity, but, as
such, can act only through individuals. Second, a lawyer’s duties of conﬁdentiality
and the application of the attorney-client privilege are relatively simple when the
client is an individual. They are not when the client is an organization. Third,
when the client is an organization, a lawyer’s duties run primarily to it; meaning
that the lawyer must take action to protect the organization’s interests, even when
doing so is contrary to the interests of the individuals within the organization
with whom the lawyer interacts. Fourth, potential and actual conﬂicts of interest
increase substantially when the client is an organization, meaning that a lawyer
must be even more sensitive to discovering and properly handling such conﬂicts.
Finally, while government lawyers are generally held to the same ethical standards
as private lawyers, their duties may vary in some circumstances.82
Attorneys for health care organizations may be outside counsel or they may
work directly for the organization as in-house counsel. Attorneys in the former
role face numerous challenges in determining who is the client and with whom
should the lawyer interact. The ﬁrst question, who is the client, is not an issue for
in-house counsel; the client is the employer. While that issue is simple, in-house
counsel faces the additional issues which arise from the dual role of representing
a client who is also one’s employer. Since the Rules generally do not distinguish
between outside and in-house counsel, the latter are “subject to the full array
of ethical rules and considerations governing the practice of law . . . and the
concomitant ﬁduciary obligations of a faithful and loyal employee.”83

82

See supra, notes 7–42 and accompanying text.

83

Carol Basri, The Client-Ethical Considerations, 126 N.Y. PRAC. LAW INST. 17, 19 (2002).
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1. Who Is the Client, and With Whom Should the Lawyer Interact?
When a client is an individual HCW, the questions of who is the client and
with whom should the lawyer interact are usually easily answered. The client is the
individual, and generally that individual is the person with whom the lawyer should
interact.84 The same cannot be true when the client is a health care organization,
of any type, because by deﬁnition, an organization is a legal entity made up of
individuals, referred to in the Rules as “constituents,”85 who are supposed to act
on behalf of the organization. A county hospital or county memorial hospital’s
constituents, for example, include the members of the board of trustees, the chief
executive ofﬁce, the chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer, and other employees. There may be
others, such as the county commissioners who have an interest in the operation
of the hospital. The variety of interested parties and their varied interests makes it
more difﬁcult, and even more important, for a lawyer to clarify who is the client86
and with which individuals may or should the lawyer interact professionally.
The attorney-client relationship in Wyoming is contractual, arising either
by express agreement of the parties or because of their conduct.87 It seems selfevident that everyone who enters into a contract should know with whom he or
she is contracting and what he or she is agreeing to. A lawyer is no different. A
lawyer should never be in doubt about whether he or she has a client or about the
identity of that client, regardless of whether the client is a health care organization
or an individual HCW. When a lawyer represents a governmental entity, the
client may be speciﬁed by statute.88 A lawyer in private practice has much more
freedom about whom the lawyer will represent. That freedom makes it imperative
that the client’s identity be addressed in an engagement letter which, inter alia:
(1) identiﬁes the client; (2) speciﬁes those persons with whom the lawyer should
or may interact; (3) clariﬁes the scope of the lawyer’s representation; (4) discusses

84

In some circumstances, that question is not quite so simple. When a client is an insured, for
example, the role of the payer may confuse the issue. It should not. Two separate rules make it clear
that a lawyer cannot ethically allow a third party payer to intrude into the attorney’s relationship with
the client. WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f ) and 5.4(c) (2006). A lawyer who represents a
client who is impaired by reason of youth, age, mental disability, or for any other reason, has special
obligations. Id. at R. 1.14. Finally, a lawyer who is appointed as an attorney for the best interests
of an individual or as a guardian ad litem for a person has special obligations. See WYO. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. Preamble [2]; R. 1.2(a) & (e); R. 1.4(b); R. 1.6(b)(5); R. 1.14(d) (2006) and
the comments thereto.
85

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2006).

86

M.C. Daly, Avoiding the Ethical Pitfall of Misidentifying the Organizational Client, 1318
N.Y. PRAC. LAW INST. 721, 724 (2002) (“[I]t is critical that the lawyer not lose sight of the client’s
identity.”).
87

Carlson v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 347 (Wyo. 1988).

88

See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-603(a)(1) (2008) (“The attorney general shall [among
other things]. . . : [p]rosecute and defend all suits instituted by or against the state of Wyoming, the
prosecution and defense of which is not otherwise provided for by law . . .”).
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the rate or rates to be paid the lawyer for the lawyer’s services (fees) and which
costs and disbursements (costs) will be the responsibility of the client; (5) sets
forth how and when fees and costs will be billed; and (6) clariﬁes who will pay the
lawyer’s fees and costs.89 Such a written engagement letter is recommended, but
not required by the Wyoming Rules.90 Lawyers who choose not to use engagement
letters are, however, asking for trouble. Without an express agreement about the
representation, the agreement between the attorney and the client may be an
implied one.91 Whenever an implied agreement arises, there will be at least two
versions of the agreement, the client’s and the lawyer’s. A dispute over the existence
of or terms of the agreement is an invitation for a client to ﬁle a grievance, a
malpractice suit, or both, when the client believes the lawyer did not live up to the
agreement, as the client understood it. A contest with a client over the existence
and/or terms of an implied agreement is always dangerous for a lawyer since the
lawyer has the burden of clarifying the existence and terms of the relationship.92
That is because the attorney-client relationship is not one between equals. The
lawyer has a ﬁduciary relationship with each client,93 and the beneﬁt of any doubt
will go to the client, the subordinate one in the relationship. Accordingly, in a
dispute between a client and a lawyer about the existence and/or terms of an
implied agreement, the lawyer is likely to lose.94
Identifying the client(s) is especially important when representing
organizations, whether private or public, small or large, proﬁt or not for proﬁt.
Unfortunately, too many lawyers do not follow the practice of using engagement
letters. That failure gets them into trouble (one simply does not read disciplinary
opinions where a lawyer had an engagement letter; virtually all involve implied
attorney-client relationships in which the attorney and the client disagree about
the terms of the implied agreement or about its very existence).

89
For a sample engagement letter, see R.W. Martin, Jr., Practicing Law in the 21st Century:
Fundamentals for Avoiding Malpractice Liability, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 191, 238 (1998).
90

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2006) (When the lawyer has not regularly
represented the client, “[t]he scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses
for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing,
before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
91
See, e.g., Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509, 513 (Wyo. 1995) (An attorney-client relationship
“‘may be implied from the conduct of the parties.’” (quoting Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1346
(Wyo. 1979))).
92
See, e.g., WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [4] (2006) (“Doubt about whether
a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clariﬁed by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so
that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client’s affairs when the
lawyer has ceased to do so.”); Carlson, 751 P.2d at 348 (“The burden of proof to show that it was
unreasonable for a client to believe that an attorney-client relationship existed . . . has to rest with
the attorney.”).
93

CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.1 (1986).

94

See Carlson, 751 P.2d at 348 (The lawyer “did not demonstrate any effort to dispel [the
former client’s] understanding . . .”).
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2. General Ethical Considerations in Representing Health Care
Organizations
Although Rule 1.13 is titled “Organization as client,” it applies only after an
attorney-client relationship has been formed between a lawyer and an organization.
The Rule does not purport to address how that relationship is or should be formed.
Accordingly, whether an attorney-client relationship exists is not determined by
the Rules, whether the client is an individual HCW or a health care organization.
Rather, the Rules say that “principles of substantive law external to these Rules
determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists.”95 Substantive law in
Wyoming, in turn, says that whether such a relationship exists “depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case.”96 Generally, an attorney-client relationship
exists if: (1) a prospective client consults a lawyer; (2) for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice; (3) the lawyer undertakes to give the advice or fails to clarify that he
or she will not give the requested advice; and (4) the prospective client relies on
the advice or the lawyer’s inaction.97 Since the ﬁrst, second, and fourth elements
are virtually always present (a prospective client almost always consults a lawyer
to receive legal advice and then nearly always relies on that advice or inaction),
the third element should be a lawyer’s focus, as it is the only element the lawyer
can control. That is, a lawyer should know when he or she is undertaking to give
legal advice, and a lawyer needs to be especially careful to ensure that prospective
clients know that the lawyer is not going to represent them as it is the failure to
clarify that a lawyer is not going to give legal advice which most often gets lawyers
in trouble.98
As noted above, the attorney-client relationship in Wyoming is contractual.99
The contract may, of course, and should be, an express one; it may, however, “be
implied from the conduct of the parties . . . [and] the general rules of agency apply
to the establishment of the relationship.”100 When the contract is implied, doubt
about whether a relationship exists, or doubt about the terms of the contract,
will be resolved in favor of the client.101 The question for a court considering

95

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope [16] (2007).

96

Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980); see
also Meyer, 889 P.2d at 513.
97
No Wyoming Supreme Court case lays out the elements of the relationship clearly. The
elements of the relationship, however, are consistent throughout the country. See, e.g., Togstad v.
Vesely, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692 (Minn. 1980).
98

See, e.g., Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 692.

99

Carlson, 751 P.2d at 347 (quoting Chavez, 604 P.2d at 1346).

100

Carlson, 751 P.2d at 347.

101

See, e.g., WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.3 cmt. [4] (2006) (“Doubt about whether
a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clariﬁed by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that
the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client’s affairs . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
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whether an attorney-client relationship existed and, if so, what its terms were, will
be whether it was reasonable for the client to believe that the relationship existed
and/or whether it was reasonable for the client to believe the terms were as the
client asserts they were.102 If so, the client (or former client) wins.
The focus on a client’s reasonable belief means that a lawyer needs to use
engagement letters when undertaking the representation of a client, especially
a new one, and to use non-engagement letters when declining to do so. This is
particularly important since the burden will be on the lawyer to show the asserted
attorney-client relationship did not exist, or that if it did, its terms are different
that the client alleges. It will be difﬁcult, if not impossible, for a lawyer to carry
that burden without having an engagement letter setting forth the scope and
terms of the relationship, or a non-engagement letter declining the representation
(it is advisable to send non-engagement letters by certiﬁed mail, return receipt
requested so one can prove mailing and delivery).103
Assuming an attorney wishes to represent an organization, properly forming
the attorney-client relationship involves an additional consideration, identifying
and specifying with which person or persons (“constituents”) in the organization
the lawyer should or may interact. The reason is simple. “A lawyer employed or
retained by an organization represents the organization, acting through its duly
authorized constituents.”104 The question for the lawyer thus becomes who are
the organization’s “duly authorized constituents”? And it does not matter if the
organization is public or private, small or large, proﬁt or not-for-proﬁt.105 The
lawyer represents the organization and the lawyer has to know with whom he or
she may or must interact.
The importance of identifying the duly authorized constituents is easily
demonstrated. Assume a lawyer represents a county hospital. The lawyer receives
two telephone calls. One is from a member of the hospital’s board of trustees.
He requests the lawyer initiate termination action against one of the hospital’s
HCWs. The other call is from the director of human resources. She tells the
lawyer to expect a call from angry trustees or others asking that an employee,
the same one identiﬁed by the trustee, be ﬁred. The director of human resources
tells the lawyer to do nothing, at least for now. Which directive should the lawyer
follow? The answer is it depends on who is “duly authorized” to act on behalf of
102

Carlson, 751 P.2d at 348.

103

For a sample non-engagement letter, see Robert W. Martin, Jr., Practicing Law in the 21st
Century: Fundamentals for Avoiding Malpractice Liability, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 191, 238
(1998).
104

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (2006).

105

Pietrina Scaraglino, Ethical Problems in Representing Nonproﬁt Corporations, 1330 N.Y.
PRAC. LAW INST. 187, 194 (2002) (“An attorney retained by a not-for-proﬁt corporation represents
the corporation itself, not its employees.”).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 2, Art. 2

392

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

the organization, the hospital, which is the client. It is very unlikely the trustee,
acting alone, is. It is likely the director of human resources is. And the lawyer better
know who it is. That knowledge, in fact, is a threshold issue for the lawyer.

3. Special Problems With Forming New Health Care Organizations.
Even more difﬁcult issues arise when a lawyer is asked to perform the legal work
necessary to form a health care organization, such as a professional corporation
or a limited liability company. It is common, for example, for professional
colleagues to decide to go into practice together. They decide to form an entity,
an organization in the parlance of the Rules, to do so, and they ask a lawyer to
do the necessary legal work. Such request presents myriad ethical issues which, if
not property resolved, can lead to serious problems for the lawyer who receives
and acts on the request. Although it was not in the health care context, such a
case reached the Wyoming Supreme Court, and the opinion provides important
guidance for health lawyers.
Meyer v. Mulligan106 involved a typical scenario. Two married couples asked a
lawyer to form a corporation to operate a business. The lawyer agreed to do so and
formed the corporation. Problems began when one couple refused to contribute
the promised money, and the couples become embroiled in a lawsuit. One couple,
the Meyers, sued the lawyer who had established the corporation for malpractice,
claiming he had negligently failed to draft documents which accurately reﬂected
the parties’ agreement.107 The attorney moved for summary judgment, arguing
that he had no attorney-client relationship with the Meyers, and they could not,
therefore, sue him; the trial court agreed and granted the motion.108 On appeal, the
supreme court reversed and said “it is not clear” who the attorney represented:109
Since the record is devoid of the speciﬁcs of any conversation
concerning representation, we cannot discern whether Mulligan
disclaimed representation of the Meyers or if the Meyers’
claimed reliance is valid. Therefore, we hold that a genuine issue
of material fact remains concerning the existence of an attorneyclient relationship between the Meyers and Mulligan.110
Meyer v. Mulligan plainly illustrates the difﬁculties a lawyer faces when asked
to represent a nascent business, whatever the context, and the problems which arise
when the lawyer does not use an engagement letter. The lawyer cannot represent

106

Meyer v. Mulligan, 889 P.2d 509 (Wyo. 1995).

107

Id. at 511-13.

108

Id. at 513.

109

Id. at 515.

110

Id.
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the entity to be formed for the simple reason that it does not exist. But the lawyer
has to represent somebody or something, and the lawyer certainly expects that
the client (whoever it is) will pay the bill. The threshold question must, therefore,
be answered. Who is the client? And what should a lawyer do to avoid becoming
trapped in the quagmire of friendly business ventures (and whether we want to
admit it or not, a medical practice is a business) gone bad?
A lawyer asked to form a business entity has some options as to whom to
represent; and the lawyer must select one, or the lawyer will be deemed to have
chosen, anyway. First, the question of the existence or terms of an attorney-client
relationship, can be solved simply by having an engagement letter which clariﬁes
the existence and terms of the relationship. Second, it may not always be easy, but
a lawyer asked to form an organization must identify the client(s). In the case of
two doctors, for example, who want to form an entity within which to practice
medicine, at least three options exist: the lawyer may agree to represent both
doctors, one doctor, or the other doctor. Whatever the choice, the lawyer should
then enter into a written agreement, usually in the form of an engagement letter,
with the client(s) selected. That agreement should, inter alia, identify the client(s),
deﬁne the scope of the representation (e.g., form a professional corporation),
specify who will be responsible for the lawyer’s bills, and state with which person
or persons the lawyer may or must interact. If the lawyer has multiple clients,
e.g., the lawyer has agreed to represent both of the doctors who wish to form an
entity, the lawyer must also advise them of the potential conﬂicts of interest which
abound in all joint representation situations, and obtain proper waivers.111
After the legal entity has been formed, the parties often expect the lawyer
who formed the entity will become its lawyer. That is generally permissible, so
long as it is done properly. The ﬁrst consideration is that assuming the agreement
with the entity’s founders speciﬁed the scope of the representation as forming the
entity, the completion of that task should conclude that representation and end
the attorney-client relationship with the founders. Even if the agreement deﬁnes
the end of the relationship, the lawyer should send a closing letter, clarifying
the status of the relationship and setting forth the lawyer’s document retention
schedule.112 It is the lawyer’s obligation, by the way, to clarify the status of the
relationship.113 If the new entity then wishes to hire the lawyer as its lawyer, that
may be done, so long as there representation does not involve an impermissible
conﬂict of interest with any current or former clients—and the entity’s founders
are now former clients.114 It is important to conclude attorney-client relationships
111
While potential conﬂicts exist, they are often conﬂicts which may be waived under See WYO.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2006).
112

For a sample closing letter, see Martin, supra note 107, at 242.

113

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2, cmt. [1] (2006).

114
Rule 1.9 regulates former client conﬂicts of interest. For a discussion of such conﬂicts, see,
John M. Burman, Conﬂicts of Interest in Wyoming, 35 LAND AND WATER L. REV., 79, 86-69 (2000).
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because the standards for conﬂicts of interest are more stringent for current clients
than for former clients,115 and a lawyer is much more likely to have on-going,
afﬁrmative obligations to a current client than to a former one.116
When a lawyer who formed an entity becomes the lawyer for that entity, the
lawyer has a new client—the entity (an “organization”). As with any new client,
the lawyer ethically must consider the possibility of conﬂicts of interest, including
those with former clients, and the lawyer should enter a written agreement with
the new client. The agreement should, of course, specify the identity of the
client, the scope of the representation, and, a critical term when representing
any organization, who is authorized to act on behalf of the organization and
on what issues.117 This may sound like much ado about nothing, and preparing
engagement and closing letters will be a bit of work. It will be time well spent as
preparing such letters is far less work than defending a lawsuit, a grievance, or
both. If a deal goes bad, the time spent documenting the existence and terms of
the relationship will provide valuable protection for the lawyer, and a court will
not be able to ﬁnd, as the Wyoming Supreme Court did in Meyer v. Mulligan, that
there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether and on what terms a lawyer
represented a client. In the absence of such an issue, the lawyer may be entitled to
summary judgment.

4. With Whom Should the Lawyer Interact?
It seems self-evident, but it bears repeating. “An organizational client is a
legal entity, but it cannot act except through its ofﬁcers, directors, employees,
shareholders and other constituents.”118 Since an organization can act only through
its “constituents,” the question for a lawyer, after an attorney-client relationship
with the organization has been formed, is who within that organization is “duly
115

Compare WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2006) (which applies to current
clients), with WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) and (b) (2006) (which applies to conﬂicts
involving former clients). Perhaps the most signiﬁcant difference is that a lawyer generally may not
represent one client against another in litigation, even if the matters are not related. WYO. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. [6] (2006). By contrast, a lawyer may represent a client against a
former client unless the matters are “substantially similar” and the interests of the former client are
“materially adverse” to those of the new client. WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2006).
116
See, e.g., WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. [5] (2006) (“[W]hen a lawyer knows
that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences
to the client, the lawyer’s duty to the client under Rule 1.4 [Communication] may require that the
lawyer offer advice . . . .”) The duty, when it exists, applies to “clients[s]”, not former clients. For a
discussion of a lawyer’s duty to advise clients about non-legal matters, see John M. Burman, Advising
Clients About Non-Legal Factors, VOL. XXVII, NO. 1, WYOMING LAWYER (February 2004).
117
WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. [7] (2006) (“When the client is an organization
or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal
affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate ofﬁcials of the
organization. See Rule 1.13.”).
118

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. [1] (2006).
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authorized” to act on behalf of the organization.119 The answer will vary, both by
the type of organization, and the precise issue(s) involved.
The governing body of a legal entity is generally speciﬁed by law. In Wyoming,
for example, it is common for HCWs to organize as “professional corporations.”120
Under the Wyoming Business Corporation Act or the Wyoming Close Corporation
Supplement, both of which are incorporated by reference in the professional
corporation statute,121 “[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the
authority of ” a board of directors.122 By contrast, the management of a limited
liability company is “vested in its members, which . . . shall be in proportion
to their contribution to the capital of the limited liability company . . . .”123 In
addition, most governing bodies have the authority to delegate various functions,
such as interacting with the entity’s lawyer, by some form of resolution.124 The keys
for the organization’s lawyer are to know: (1) the law governing the organization;
and (2) how and to whom the governing documents, the governing body, or
both, of the organization has delegated authority. Ultimately, the lawyer must
know who is authorized by law, the governing documents, or the governing body
of the organization to act on its behalf, and what those individuals are authorized
to do.
The “duly authorized constituents” are the individuals, of course, with whom
the organization’s lawyer will normally communicate about the representation.
Having a speciﬁed individual or individuals with whom to communicate is not
simply an ethical imperative. As the commentary to Rule 1.4 (Communication)
notes, it is a practical necessity because it “is often impossible or inappropriate to
inform every one of [the organization’s] members about its legal affairs; ordinarily,
[therefore,] the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate ofﬁcials
of the organization.”125
Even after identifying the individuals with whom the organization’s
lawyer should interact, a lawyer has the ethical obligation to make sure that
those individuals understand the lawyer’s role. Many will not. The common
119

Id. at R. 1.13(a) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”).
120
See WYO. STAT ANN. § 17-3-101 (2008) (“A corporation organized under the Wyoming
Business Corporation Act or the Wyoming Statutory Close Corporation Supplement [chapter 17 of
this title] . . . may, by and through the person or persons of such licensed stockholder or stockholders,
or licensed employees, practice and offer professional services in such profession.”).
121

Id.

122

Id. at. § 17-16-801(a).

123

Id. at § 17-15-116.

124

See, e.g., id. at § 17-16-841 (“Each ofﬁcer has the authority and shall perform the duties set
forth in the bylaws or . . . [and] the duties prescribed by the board of directors . . .”).
125

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. [7] (2006).
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misunderstanding involves the question just discussed. Whom does the lawyer
for an organization represent? Many, if not most, of an organization’s constituents will assume the lawyer represents them and the organization, and not
just the organization.126
Because many constituents will misunderstand the lawyer’s role, a lawyer
who represents an organization must ensure constituents with whom he or she
interacts understand that the organization’s lawyer does not generally represent
the organization’s constituents, even those “duly authorized” to speak for it.
Similarly, the lawyer must take care to avoid implying that he or she represents
the duly authorized constituents individually. The failure to do so may result in
the inadvertent creation of an attorney-client relationship with such individuals
arising by implication.127 While it is ethically permissible to represent both an
organization and some of its constituents in some circumstances, a lawyer should
never allow an attorney-client relationship to arise inadvertently. It will be ethically
permissible to represent both an organization and some of its constituents only
when no impermissible conﬂicts of interest exist between the interests of the
organization and those of the individual constituents.128 If representation of both
the organization and a constituent is ethically permissible and the attorney intends
to have an attorney-client relationship with each, those relationships should both
be explicit. A lawyer should simply never allow an attorney-client relationship to
arise by implication; to do so is to invite problems.
Furthermore, whenever a lawyer represents an organization, the lawyer must
be aware of the possible divergence of interest between the client (the organization)
and the constituents of the organization with whom the lawyer is dealing. The
reason is that when it becomes “apparent” that their interests are adverse, the
lawyer has an ethical duty to “explain the identity of the client . . . [and] that the
organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the
lawyer is dealing.”129 Where the interests of the organization and constituents
diverge, and the constituents do not have separate counsel, the lawyer for the
organization is essentially dealing with an unrepresented person. Accordingly, the
only advice the lawyer may ethically give the constituent, which the lawyer should

126
ABA ANN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, 91 (5th ed. 2007) (“Many corporate executives
apparently do not realize that corporate counsel represents the corporation only, and not them as
individuals.”).
127

Id.

128

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(e) (2006) (“A lawyer representing an organization
may also represent any of its directors, ofﬁcers, employees, members, shareholders or other
constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7 [Rule 1.7 regulates concurrent conﬂicts of
interest].”).
129

Id. at R. 1.13(d).
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give, is that the individual should obtain counsel.130 As an example, when an
organization is being sued for the actions or inactions of one of its constituents,
the interests of the organization and those of that individual whose actions led
to the suit, are potentially adverse. The organization may have an interest, for
example, in trying to avoid liability by asserting that the individual was acting
beyond the scope of his or her employment. The individual’s interest, by contrast,
is to make sure that the organization is responsible for the individual’s actions or
inactions, and will, therefore, likely assert that the actions in question were within
the scope of employment. In such circumstances, the divergence of interests is
obvious, and direct. Because of that divergence of interests, the organization’s
lawyer must be careful to notify the individual of the identity of the lawyer’s client
(the organization), and that the lawyer is looking after the client’s interests, not
the individual’s.131
As with any attorney-client relationship, the information the lawyer learns
in the course of the representation is often conﬁdential,132 regardless of when
or how the information was learned.133 Accordingly, the information a lawyer
learns from constituents of the organization is conﬁdential. The lawyer may not,
therefore, generally disclose the information to anyone other than the client
without an “informed decision”134 by the client to allow such disclosure.135 The
lawyer must be careful, however, not to disclose information learned from one
constituent to another unless the constituent to whom the disclosure is made is
authorized to receive the information. The reason is simple. The mere fact that a
lawyer has obtained conﬁdential information from a constituent “does not mean
. . . that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer.”136
130

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2006) (“The lawyer shall not give legal advice to
an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in
conﬂict with the interests of the client.”) (emphasis added).
131

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d) (2006).

132

Wyoming’s Rule on conﬁdentiality is unique. It protects “conﬁdential information relating
to the representation . . .” WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006). “Conﬁdential
information” means “information provided by the client or relating to the client which is not
otherwise available to the public.”). The ABA Model Rules are not limited to “conﬁdential
information.” They apply to “information relating to the representation.” ABA MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.6(a) (2008).
133

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006).

134

“Informed decision” means “the decision by a person to a proposed course of conduct after
the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of
and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” WYO. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.0(f ) (2006).
135

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006).

136

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. [3] (2006) (“The lawyer may not disclose
to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or
impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as
otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6 [the Rule on conﬁdentiality]”).
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The lawyer must be careful, therefore, not to create the impression that the
lawyer represents the constituent by disclosing conﬁdential information to
unauthorized constituents.
With small businesses, including professional practices, the same individuals
often ﬁll multiple roles. The same persons are often a professional corporation’s
shareholders, directors, and ofﬁcers. A lawyer’s obligations do not, however,
change because of the relative size of an organization. The organization’s lawyer
still represents the organization and does not automatically represent the
constituents.137 In such circumstances, however, the possibility of confusion about
the lawyer’s role is signiﬁcantly increased, and the lawyer needs to be especially
careful to clarify his or her role. The question of whether the lawyer represents
only the organization or the individuals within the organization, too, should be
expressly addressed. The reason is simple. The individuals will probably assume
that the lawyer represents the organization and themselves, as well, particularly
when the lawyer has extensive interactions with one or more of the organization’s
constituents.138 Failing to clarify the lawyer’s role may mean just that. If the lawyer
has done nothing to defeat the client’s expectation that the lawyer represents the
organization and the individuals who constitute it, and if that expectation is
reasonable, the lawyer has probably allowed an attorney-client relationship to arise
by implication.139 Once again, the clariﬁcation should be done in an engagement
letter with the organization which clariﬁes the identify of the client and that the
lawyer does not represent the constituents, individually.

5. Summary
Organizational clients present special ethical challenges for a lawyer. Those
challenges are not, however, insurmountable. First, the lawyer must identify the
client. In the case of a health care organization, it is the organization, whether
small or large, private or government, proﬁt or not-for-proﬁt. Second, the lawyer
must identify the individuals (the “constituents”) who are authorized to act on
behalf of the organization and with respect to which issues. Third, when it is
apparent that the interests of the organization and those of the constituent(s)
with whom the lawyer is dealing are adverse, the lawyer has a duty to notify
the constituent of the identity of the client (the organization), that the lawyer is
representing the organization, not the constituent, and that the constituent may
want to seek legal counsel.
The ﬁrst two issues, the identity of the client and the individuals authorized
to act on behalf of the client, should be clariﬁed in a written agreement between
the client and the lawyer, usually an engagement letter. Such an agreement will
137

ABA/BNA LAWYER’S MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT § 91:2015.

138

Id.

139

Id. at 91:2001.
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eliminate the possibility of the lawyer, of a court, wondering who the client is or
was. The third issue, advising constituents about the lawyer’s role, is critical to
avoiding an attorney-client relationship arising by implication, which will put
the lawyer in a conﬂict which is likely non-waivable, and which will likely require
the lawyer to withdraw from the representation of both the organization and
the individual.

B. Conﬁdentiality and the Attorney-Client Privilege.
1. Introduction
A lawyer has both a legal and an ethical obligation to maintain client
conﬁdences. The legal obligation arises out of the law of agency, the law of
evidence (through the attorney-client privilege)140 and the rules of civil and
criminal procedure (which embody the work-product doctrine141). Each requires
a lawyer to preserve client conﬁdences, certain information regarding a client
or the client’s case; or both, and each survives the termination of the attorneyclient relationship.142
A lawyer’s ethical obligation of conﬁdentiality is based on Rule 1.6 of the
Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct, or similar rules in other states. The
Wyoming Rule says that a lawyer “shall not reveal conﬁdential information
relating to representation of a client . . . ,” however the information is learned
and regardless of the source.143 The ethical duty is much broader than either
140

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, § 395 (2006) (“[A]n agent is
subject to a duty to the principal not to use or to communicate information conﬁdentially given
him by the principal . . .”).
The attorney-client privilege is part of the law in every American jurisdiction, either by statute,
court rule, or common-law. Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 6.3.1 (West 1986).
Generally, it prevents an attorney from testifying about communications to or from a client and the
lawyer regarding the representation. Id.
141
See, e.g., WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). A lawyer must assert the privilege or it disappears. Id. at
26(b)(5) and WYO. R. CRIM P. 16(a)(2) & (b)(2).
142
After the end of an agency relationship, the agent may not use or disclose “trade secrets,
written lists of names, or other, similar conﬁdential information concerning the methods of business
of the principal . . . . The agent is entitled to use general information concerning the method of
business of the principal . . . .” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 396(b) (2006). While many
statutes or rules which establish the attorney-client privilege are silent on the question of whether
the privilege continues after the end of the attorney-client relationship, courts generally hold that the
privilege continues, along with the attorney’s obligation to assert it. Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS, § 6.3.4 (West 1986). The privilege generally extends after the death of a client. See,
e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. U.S., 524 U.S. 399, 407 (1998).
143
WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a)(2006); see also id. at R. 1.6 cmt. [6] (“The rule of
client-lawyer conﬁdentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is sought from the
lawyer through compulsion of law. The conﬁdentiality rule, for example, applies not only to matters
communicated in conﬁdence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation,
whatever its source.”).
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the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine since it applies to all
“conﬁdential information relating to the representation.”144 The attorney-client
privilege, by contrast, protects only communications between a lawyer and a
client.145 The work-product doctrine protects only “trial preparation materials.”146
Accordingly, everything which is subject to the attorney-client privilege or the
work-product doctrine is conﬁdential under Rule 1.6, but information which is
covered by Rule 1.6 may not be protected by either the attorney-client privilege or
the work-product doctrine (a communication from a third person, for example, is
subject to Rule 1.6 if it is conﬁdential information that relates to the representation.
That communication is not protected by the attorney-client privilege, because it is
not a communication to or from a client, and it is not subject to the work-product
doctrine as it was not prepared in anticipation of litigation.) The ethical duty
of conﬁdentiality is, however, similar to the legal duty in one important way. It
never ends.147 Not only is the scope of the duties different, they apply at different
times, too.
The attorney-client privilege applies when communications between a lawyer
and a client are sought from the attorney or the client through judicial or other
legal processes, including discovery.148 The attorney-client privilege is much
narrower, as it applies only to communications between a lawyer and a client, not
to other information the lawyer learns during the representation.149
Applying the conﬁdentiality concept, the attorney-client privilege, or the
work product doctrine becomes signiﬁcantly more difﬁcult when the client is an
organization. The identity of the client is clear; it is the organization. A lawyer
cannot communicate, however, with a legal entity. The lawyer must communicate
with one or more constituents of the entity.

144

Id. at R. 1.6(a).

145

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a) (2008).

146

WYO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); see also WYO. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) & (b)(2).

147

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) and R. 1.6, cmt. [25] (2006).

148

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. [6]. The attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine are not a part of the rules of ethics. Id. The attorney-client privilege is part
of the law of evidence and is differently deﬁned in different jurisdictions. The privilege generally
exists when four features a present: (1) There is a communication; (2) between privileged persons
(an attorney or the attorney’s staff and a client); (3) made in conﬁdence; and (4) for the purpose of
obtaining or providing legal advice. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 68 (2000).
149

See, e.g., ABA/BNA LAWYER’S MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT § 55:304 (“the ethical duty of
conﬁdentiality is much broader in scope and covers communications that would not be protected
under the [attorney-client privilege].”).
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2. Which Information is Subject to the Conﬁdentiality Obligation of
Rule 1.6?
The language of Rule 1.6 is clear: “A lawyer shall not reveal conﬁdential
information relating to representation of a client . . .”150 The commentary to Rule
1.13 (“Organization as client”) discusses the application of the conﬁdentiality
principle to an organizational client. “When one of the constituents of an
organizational client communicates with the organization’s lawyer in that person’s
organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6 [The Rule
which creates the ethical duty of conﬁdentiality]”151 It does not matter, in short,
if the client is an individual or an organization. The Rule applies. Since the Rule
applies, a lawyer may not reveal conﬁdential information about the representation
of a client, regardless of how it is learned, unless the client makes an informed
decision to allow the disclosure, the disclosure is “impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation,”152 or unless one of the Rule’s narrow
exceptions applies.153
Although it is easy to say that all conﬁdential information which relates to
representation of an organizational client “shall not be revealed,”154 the more
difﬁcult question is to whom within the organization may a lawyer ethically
disclose such information? Assume, for example, that a lawyer conducts an
investigation for an organization the request of the organization’s board of directors
(the governing authority for a corporation). The lawyer receives information
from a variety of sources, including many “constituents” of the organization.
Some are high level management, such as corporate ofﬁcers. Others are lower
level employees or other constituents, such as stockholders. As noted above, the
information communicated to the lawyer by any constituent in that individual’s
organizational capacity is conﬁdential. The question becomes, therefore, which
conﬁdential information may be shared with which constituents?
The commentary to the Rule 1.13 (Organization as a client) provides
important guidance. Information learned from organizational constituents is
conﬁdential. The lawyer may not, however, necessarily disclose such information
learned from one constituent to another:

150

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006).

151

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. [3] (2006).

152

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006).

153

A lawyer may disclose otherwise conﬁdential information if the lawyer “reasonably believes”
disclosure is necessary to prevent a client “from committing a criminal act,” “to establish a claim
or defense” in a dispute with a client, or “to comply with other law or court order,” or “to protect
the best interests” of an individual for whom the attorney is acting as guardian ad litem. See id. at
R. 1.6(b)(1), (2), (3).and (4).
154

Id.
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The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information
relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly
or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to
carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule
1.6 [“Conﬁdentiality of information”].155
The answer should have a familiar ring. A lawyer may disclose conﬁdential
information only to duly authorized constituents. The question comes back, in
short, to the question addressed above. With whom should a lawyer interact when
representing an organization? Such constituent is likely also authorized to receive
information from the lawyer. Accordingly, the answer is disclosure may be made
to the persons duly authorized by the organization to interact with the lawyer.
An attorney’s ethical duty of conﬁdentiality may, of course, be waived by
the client.156 That waiver may be explicit or implicit. An attorney may reveal
conﬁdential information if “the client makes an informed decision,” or if
disclosure is “impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation.”157 The
questions which arises when the client is an organization are: (1) who may make
a decision to waive conﬁdentiality; and (2) with whom must the lawyer consult
before that waiver is valid? The answers follow from the concept that the client is
the organization. Therefore, the organization may waive conﬁdentiality. As with
other decisions by an organization, this one must be made by the organization’s
governing body or someone duly authorized by that body to act in its stead. This
means that information imparted to the attorney by an individual is controlled by
the organization, not by the individual from whom it was received.

3. Applying the Attorney-Client Privilege to a Health Care
Organization.
The attorney-client privilege is “the oldest of the privileges of the common
law . . .”158 The privilege is not only recognized by federal law,159 it is a part of the
law of evidence in every U.S. jurisdiction.160 Since it is part of the law of evidence,
the starting point in analyzing the applicability of the privilege is the rules of
evidence. Rule 501 of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence says “[e]xcept as otherwise
required by . . . statute . . . the privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the
principles of the common law . . .”161 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
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WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. [3] (2006).

156

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006).

157

Id.

158

Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).

159

Id. at 396-97.

160

Charles.W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 6.1.1 (West 1986).

161

WYO. R. EVID. 501.
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contains identical language.162 While the attorney-client privilege in Wyoming is
now statutory, the federal privilege is part of the federal common law.163
The attorney-client privilege in Wyoming is codiﬁed in statute, but the statute
is regrettably sparse, especially on issues involving its application to an entity.164
The statute simply says:
The following persons shall not testify in certain respects:
An attorney or physician concerning a communication made to
him by his client or patient in that relation, or his advice to his
client or patient. The attorney or physician may testify by express
consent of the client or patient, and if the client or patient
voluntarily testiﬁes the attorney or physician may be compelled
to testify on the same subject;165
That’s it. The statute sets forth three criteria. First, an “attorney” may not
testify in certain respects. Second, the privilege is limited to “communications”
from a client to an attorney or the attorney’s “advice” to the client. Finally, the
communications or advice must be “in that relation,” i.e., communications
which are a part of the attorney-client relationship. The statute leaves numerous
questions unanswered, including questions about how the privilege applies to
organizational clients, if it applies at all.166
The ﬁrst problem is that Wyoming’s statute, on its face, provides a privilege
for attorneys to not testify about their communications to or from a client, but
it does not provide a reciprocal privilege for clients. Second, the statute makes
no mention of the non-attorney staff members who work for an attorney,
persons such as secretaries, investigators, and paralegals, who often have more
communications with a client than the attorney. Third, the statute is silent on
if or how the privilege should be applied to organizational clients. The statute’s
silence about organizational clients raises three signiﬁcant issues: (1) Does the
attorney-client privilege apply to organizational clients at all? (2) If so, which
communications between an attorney and individuals within the organization
are privileged? (3) Finally, who within the organization may waive the privilege?

162

FED. R. EVID. 501.

163

Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389.

164

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a) (2008).

165

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a) (2008) (emphasis added).

166

Statutes in other states often address such issues directly. In Arizona, for example, the
statute includes an attorney’s “paralegal, assistant, secretary, stenographer or clerk.” ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 12-2234(A) (2007). It further provides that “any communication is privileged between an attorney
for a corporation, governmental entity, partnership, business, association or other similar entity or
an employer and any employee, agent or member of the entity . . . .” Id. at § 12-2234(B).
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This section will address the general questions surrounding the attorney-client
privilege in Wyoming, as well as those issues unique to organizations.
a. The Attorney-Client Privilege Applies to Clients, As Well As to Lawyers.
As noted, Wyoming’s statute says that “attorneys” may not testify in certain
respects, but it says nothing about clients. The notion that the omission of any
reference to clients means that they are not covered by the attorney-client privilege
ﬂies in the face of the reasons for the privilege, as well as the applicability of the
common-law privilege.
The reason for the attorney-client privilege, according to the United States
Supreme Court, is to encourage “full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance
of law and the administration of justice.”167 That policy is so important that
the privilege has been extended to include not just communications between a
lawyer and a client, but observations “which [are] the product of a privileged
communication.”168 Not extending the privilege to include observations “might
chill free and open communication between attorney and client and might
also inhibit counsel’s investigation of his client’s case.”169 So, too, not applying
the privilege to protect clients from testifying would severely chill attorneyclient communications, and courts have interpreted the privilege to foster
communications, not chill it.
Over a century ago, the Alabama Supreme Court put it well. The privilege
“against the disclosure of such communications by counsel would be a mockery
if the client could be compelled to disclose that as to which counsel’s lips are
sealed.”170 Not extending Wyoming’s attorney-client privilege to prevent a client
from testifying would seriously chill full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients; not doing so would make a mockery out of the
privilege. It is hard to imagine, therefore, that the Wyoming Supreme Court
would not construe the statue which codiﬁes the attorney-client privilege to also
prevent clients from having to testify.

167

Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.

168

People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981).

169

Id. at 48.

170

Birmingham Railway and Electric, Co., v. Wildman, 24 So. 546, 549-50 (Ala. 1898).
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b. The Attorney-Client Privilege Applies to an Attorney’s Non-Attorney
Staff.
A second problem with Wyoming’s attorney-client privilege statute is that
it refers only to a communication between a client and an “attorney.”171 Many
of a lawyer’s communications with a client, however, are through non-attorney
support staff members, such as a secretary, an investigator, or a paralegal. The
absence of any reference in the statute to non-attorney support staff raises the
question of whether the attorney-client privilege covers communications between
a client and a non-attorney staff member. It should.
One of the most recent and most comprehensive analyses of the attorneyprivilege is contained in the Third Restatement of The Law Governing Lawyers. The
Restatement asserts that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications
between “privileged persons.”172 The term “privileged persons” is then deﬁned
as “the client (including a prospective client), the client’s lawyer, [and] agents of
either who facilitate communication between them . . .”173 A person is a privileged
agent if “the person’s participation is reasonably necessary to facilitate the client’s
communication with a lawyer . . .”174 Since it is often reasonably necessary for a
client and a lawyer to communicate through other person’s, the attorney-client
privilege should extend to them, as well.
c.

The Attorney-Client Privilege Applies to Organizational Clients.

Although there has been substantial debate about whether the attorney-client
privilege should apply to organizations, that debate has been resolved in favor of
such a privilege in every jurisdiction which has considered the issue.175 Accordingly,
the general view is that when the client is “a corporation, unincorporated
association, partnership, trust, estate, sole proprietorship, or other for-proﬁt
or not-for-proﬁt organization, the attorney-client privilege extends” to quailed
communications between privileged persons.176 A qualiﬁed communication is
one which is made “for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance to
the client.”177 Privileged persons include, those whose participation “is reasonably
necessary to facilitate the client’s communication with a lawyer.”178 Since an
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WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(1) (2008).

172

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 68 (2000).

173

Id. at § 70.

174

Id. at § 70 cmt. f.
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Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.5.3, 283-84 (West 1986).

176

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 73 (2000).

177

Id. at § 68(4).

178

Id. at § 70 cmt. f.
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organization can act only through its agents, it is reasonably necessary to protect
communications between at least some of the organization’s agents (constituents)
and the organization’s attorney. Extending the privilege to organizations is also
consistent with promoting the policy behind the privilege. Including associations
within the privilege “encourages organizational clients to have their agents
conﬁde in lawyer in order to realize the organization’s legal rights and to achieve
compliance with law.”179
Although the Wyoming attorney-client statute is silent180 and no Wyoming
Supreme Court opinions are on point, it is reasonable to expect that the privilege
will be extended to organizations in Wyoming as has been done everywhere
else.181 In addition to the overwhelming weight of authority in other jurisdictions,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has acknowledged the need for corporate privacy
by limiting the ex parte contacts a lawyer for an opposing party may have with
corporate employees.182 The same principles argue in favor of extending the
attorney-client privilege to include organizations. Doing so, however, does
not end the inquiry. The next issue is to deﬁne the scope of the privilege in an
organizational setting. And while it is reasonable to assume that the privilege will
be extended to organizations in Wyoming, predicting the scope of the privilege is
more difﬁcult.
d. Which Communications To or From Which Constituents of an
Organization Are Protected by the Attorney-Client Privilege?
Two general views of the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the
organizational setting have emerged: (1) the control-group test; and (2) the subjectmatter test.183 The control-group test is based on the notion that the attorneyclient privilege applies only to communications between the organization’s lawyer
and persons who have managerial responsibility or control of the issue(s) involved
in the communications. The standard is difﬁcult to apply, however, because
the parameters of the control group will vary with the issue(s) involved.184 The
persons with managerial responsibility for one area of the organization’s operation
may be different than the persons responsible for another. As the composition of
the control group varies, it is difﬁcult to know which communications with which
179

Id. at § 72 cmt. b.

180

The Wyoming statute refers only to “client,” without deﬁnition of that term. WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (2008).
181

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 73 cmt. b. (2000) (“Extending
the attorney-client privilege to corporations and other organizations was formerly a matter of doubt
but is no longer questioned.”).
182

Strawser v. Exxon, 843 P.2d 613, 616-17 (Wyo. 1992).

183

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 73 cmt. b. (2000). See also,
Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 385 (1981).
184

Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 392 (The control group test “is difﬁcult to apply.”).
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persons are protected. This lack of predictability renders the test impractical
since “the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of
certainty whether particular discussions will be protected [because a]n uncertain
privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at all.”185 In addition, by deﬁnition,
the test excludes communications between the attorney for the organization
and constituents without managerial responsibility. As a result, persons with
important information, usually factual, fall outside the protection of the privilege.
Similarly, individuals who are not part of the control group may be responsible
for implementing the lawyer’s legal advice. Not protecting the communications
with the organization’s lawyer “makes it more difﬁcult to convey full and frank
legal advice to the employees who will put into effect the client corporation’s
policy.”186 Ultimately, the narrow scope of the control group theory “not only
makes it difﬁcult for corporate attorneys to formulae sound advice . . . [it] also
threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client’s
compliance with the law.”187
The subject-matter test takes a very different approach. Communications
between an organization’s lawyer and any constituents of the organization are
subject to the attorney-client privilege if they relate to the giving or receiving of
legal advice.188 The test was given a signiﬁcant boost in 1981 when the United
States Supreme Court rejected the control-group test and, at least implicitly,
adopted the subject-matter test in its decision in Upjohn Co. v. United States.189
The Court began by reiterating the purpose of the privilege. It exists, wrote then
Justice Rehnquist, to “protect . . . the giving of professional advice to those who
can act on it, but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to
give sound and informed advice.”190 Although the Court criticized and rejected
the control group test, its adoption of the subject matter test has not ended the
debate for two reasons. First, Upjohn involved the scope of the federal law of
attorney-client privilege and the scope of the privilege is often an issue of state
law. Second, the subject-matter test requires a case-by-case analysis. Since Upjohn,
some states have rejected the subject matter test, deciding to retain the control
group test.191 Courts have generally been unwilling to adopt the subject-matter

185

Id.

186

Id.

187

Id.

188

Charles W, Wolfram. MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 6.5.4, 285 (West 1986).

189

Upjohn Co.,449 U.S. at 390.

190

Id. at 389-90.

191

See, e.g., Nalian Truck Lines, Inc., v. Nakano Warehouse & Transportation Corp.,
8 Cal. Rptr.2d 467, 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (The drafters of the rules of professional conduct in
California “intended to retain the control group test.”).
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test in toto, preferring some sort of hybrid test. Also, applying the test case-by-case
has resulted in numerous attempts to formulate a workable standard. The decision
in Boyer v. Board of County Commissioners192 is a good example of the latter.
Boyer involved a §1983 claim of unlawful retaliation. Ruling on a motion
to compel discovery, the court discussed the practical application of the subjectmatter test. The court took a pragmatic approach, noting that corporations
act “through all employees acting within the scope of their employment.”193
Accordingly, it adopted the Upjohn decision’s approach that the giving of sound
legal advice requires corporate counsel to gather information from “multiple levels
of the corporation . . . .“194 When it comes to the question of the applicability
of the attorney-client privilege, therefore, the inquiry must be “whether the
communications [to or from non-managerial constituents] were made at the
request of management in order to allow the corporation to secure legal advice.”195
The court then crafted a two step test: (1) the status of the employee; and (2) the
context of the communication. If the employee occupies a managerial position,
communications will generally be privileged. Regardless of an employee’s status,
however, if the employee is a “primary source for information concerning the
facts” involved in the legal matter, the attorney’s communications with that person
will be covered by the attorney-client privilege.196
The Boyer opinion, which has been often cited, usually favorably, by both
courts and commentators, recognizes that organizations often act through
constituents who are not in managerial positions, and that if the attorney-client
privilege is going to accomplish its goals, it must include communications with the
relevant actors, regardless of their positions.197 The opinion represents a logical,
practical approach to the issue, an approach which is similar to the approach taken
by the Wyoming Supreme Court in the Strawser case, which involved the related
issue of ex parte communications with corporate employees.198 Further, Boyer
was afﬁrmed by the Tenth Circuit.199 Judge Brorby authored the unpublished
opinion.200
The Restatement also favors the subject matter test over the control group test
since the latter “overlooks that the division of functions within an organization
often separates decisionmakers from those knowing relevant facts.”201 It seems
192

Boyer v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 162 F.R.D. 687 (D. Kan. 1994).

193

Id. at 690.
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Id. at 689.
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Id. at 690.
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Boyer v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 162 F.R.D. 687, 690 (D. Kan. 1994).
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Strawser v. Exxon, 843 P.2d 613, 614 (Wyo. 1992).

199

Boyer v. Johnson County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 108 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1997).
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Although the opinion is unpublished, it is available at 1997 WL 143597.
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RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 73, cmt. d, (2000).
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clear, therefore, that the better reasoned approach is the subject matter test or
some variant of it. When all is said and done, however, lawyers in Wyoming have
no clear standards for which communications with which of an organization’s
constituents will be protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Although the parameters of the attorney-client privilege in Wyoming
with respect to organizations are unclear, an attorney can and should advise
organizational clients about that uncertainly. The lawyer should advise
organizational constituents that the scope of the privilege in Wyoming is unclear,
and that communications with non-managerial persons may not be protected.
The attorney should make such a disclosure since most constituents will have
the expectation that their communications with the organization’s lawyer are
privileged. Disclosing that they may not be may result in reticent constituents,
but that is preferable to constituents having an expectation of conﬁdentiality
which turns out to be incorrect. If that occurs, the lawyer will likely be the target
of a grievance, a malpractice action, or both, premised on the lawyer’s failure
to properly disclose the true situation and “explain [the] matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation . . .”202
While the scope of the attorney-client privilege is unclear, an organizational
lawyer’s ethical duty is clear. Whatever the source of the information, it is
conﬁdential under Rule 1.6, meaning that the lawyer may not disclose it in
the absence of an informed decision by the client to waive that conﬁdentiality,
unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the rule or the lawyer has a duty to
disclose.203
e.

Who Within An Organization May Waive the Attorney-Client
Privilege?

The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client.204 Since an organizational
lawyer’s client is the organization, the privilege belongs to it, regardless of which
test is adopted to deﬁne the scope of the privilege. Accordingly, the organization
may waive the privilege.205 This creates the potential that constituents who were

202

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2006). Although not designed to serve as a basis
for civil liability, “the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, [and] the Rules may be
evidence of the applicable standard of conduct.” Id. at Scope [19].
203
For discussions of exceptions to the rule and a lawyer’s duty to disclose, see John M. Burman,
An Attorney’s Duty to Warn, Vol 30, No.1, WYOMING LAWYER (February 2007) and John M. Burman,
The Disclosure of Conﬁdential Information Under the New Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct, Vol
29. No 6, WYOMING LAWYER (December 2006).
204
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101(a)(i) (2008) (An attorney may testify “by express
consent of the client . . . . ”).
205

Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 6.5.4 (West 1986).
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not involved in communications with the organization’s lawyer may, nevertheless,
have the authority to decide to waive the privilege. Similarly, constituents who
were involved in the combinations may not be in a position to oppose a waiver.
Such a situation is likely contrary to the expectations of those constituents who
were involved in the communications. It is important, therefore, for the lawyer
involved in the communications to ensure that constituent’s expectations regarding
the attorney-client privilege are accurate.
Under the control-group test, the subject-matter test, or any other test
which the court might adopt, it is likely that at least some of the constituents
who communicate with an organization’s lawyer will not be in a position to
control the decision of whether to waive the privilege. Yet those constituents will
probably assume that their communications with the organization’s lawyer are
privileged, and that they are the ones who may waive or insist on the privilege.
Both of those assumptions may be incorrect—and it is the lawyer’s responsibility
to correct them.
As discussed above, the scope of the attorney-client privilege in Wyoming is
unclear, and that uncertainty should be disclosed to the organization’s constituents
with whom the attorney is interacting.206 In addition, the constituent(s) with
whom the lawyer is dealing may not be the one(s) who will decide if the privilege
should be waived. To ensure that those persons are properly informed, the lawyer
should explain that someone else will be making that decision. The reason is
that the organization’s interests may well diverge from a constituent’s. Consider a
simple example.207
An organization (a corporation) is being investigated for illegal activity. The
corporation’s lawyer learns, through conversations with corporate constituents,
that persons within the entity were involved in the activity. The corporate
management decides that the best approach is to disclose to the appropriate
regulatory ofﬁcials which individuals were involved in the illegal activity. The
decision, in other words, is to hang someone out to dry, for the beneﬁt of the
corporation. While that may be the best strategy for the organization, it is likely
counter to the interests of the person(s) who are to be hung out to dry. Because
of the clear divergence of interests, which was a potential conﬂict from the outset,
the lawyer should have notiﬁed the constituents of the possible outcome, i.e.,
that although the conversations between the lawyer and the constituent may well
be privileged under any test the court may adopt, the corporation may decide to
waive the privilege, regardless of the wishes of the constituents involved in the
communications. Only with such a disclosure at the time of the initial contact
with the constituent can the lawyer avoid being the subject of a disgruntled

206

See supra notes 188–208 and accompanying text.
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This example is based on the facts of Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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constituent’s wrath when there is a waiver of the privilege (or the ethical duty of
conﬁdentiality), thereby disclosing the individual’s potential culpability. Such a
disclosure will also satisfy the lawyer’s disclosure obligations under Rule 1.13(d);
those obligations are discussed above.208
f.

Summary

Although the applicability and scope of the attorney-client privilege in
Wyoming are not speciﬁed in the statute, the answers to three fundamental
questions are reasonably predictable, while the answer to a fourth is less certain.
First, there is little doubt the privilege will apply to protect clients, and not
just their lawyers. Second, it is reasonable to assume that the privilege will be
applied to organizations’ in Wyoming, just as it has in every jurisdiction which
has considered the issue. To hold otherwise would completely undermine the
purpose of the privilege, encouraging full disclosure between an attorney and the
attorney’s client. Third, there is also little doubt that the privilege belongs to the
organization, and it, acting through its governing body, may waive the privilege,
just as it may waive a lawyer’s ethical duty of conﬁdentiality.
The question which is both unanswered and difﬁcult to predict with accuracy
is what is the scope of the privilege? Will it be deﬁned by the control group
test, the subject matter test, or something else? The better reasoned view is the
subject matter test, or some variant of it. That view is better reasoned because
it recognizes reality. Organizations act through all constituents, not just those
in managerial positions, and it is critical that an organization’s lawyer be able
to commentate with relevant constituents, regardless of their position in the
organization, conﬁdent that the communications will be privileged.
Whatever the scope of the privilege, an organization’s lawyer must be careful
to correct constituents’ misconceptions about the nature of their communications.
A constituent needs to know the communications may not be privileged, and that
the organization, not the constituent, will have the ability to waive the privilege,
if it exists, the attorney’s ethical duty of conﬁdentiality, or both.

D. A Lawyer’s Whistle-Blowing Obligations.
Identifying the client, the constituents authorized to act on behalf of the
client, and properly applying the conﬁdentiality principles to organizations are
critically important, but doing so does not end an organizational lawyer’s ethical
duties to the client. Among the lawyer’s other duties to the organization is the
obligation to blow the whistle when the actions or inactions of an individual
within or associated with the organization threaten the organization.

208

See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
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1. The Ethical Framework
Generally, clients, not lawyers, call the shots: ethically, a lawyer “shall abide by
the client’s decisions regarding the objectives of the representation.”209 Further, a
lawyer “shall consult with the client as to the means by which they [the objectives]
are to be pursued.”210 As in any attorney-client relationship, the attorney for an
organization is an agent for the client, who is the principal in that relationship.
An agent must, of course, “act solely for the beneﬁt of the principal . . .”211
Furthermore, as an agent, “the lawyer generally owes the client rigorously enforced
ﬁduciary duties . . .”212 The lawyer for an organization, therefore, is both an agent
and a ﬁduciary for the organization—and to it ﬂow all the ethical and legal duties
a lawyer owes to any client, including the duties of loyalty, conﬁdentiality, and
competence.213
Paragraph (b) of Rule 1.13 articulates the importance of the lawyer’s duty of
loyalty to an organizational client. It is based on the principle that since a lawyer
for an organization represents the organization, the lawyer must act to protect
the organization from individuals who might harm it, even if those individuals
are constituents who work for or are associated with the organization and are
constituents with whom the lawyer interacts. The lawyer must, in short, ignore
his or her personal relationship with any such constituent and blow the whistle
on any person whose actions or inactions threaten the organization’s best interests
from within.
The whistle-blowing provisions, paragraphs (b) and (c) of Rule 1.13, contain
two components. First, the organization’s lawyer must “know” certain things.
Second, if the lawyer does “know” those things, the lawyer must act to protect the
organization.
“Know” is a deﬁned term. It means “actual knowledge of the fact in question.
A person’s knowledge may [however] be inferred from circumstances.”214 It is
not enough, therefore, for a lawyer to suspect, believe, or even reasonably believe
something. The lawyer must “know” before the whistle blowing obligation is
triggered. The lawyer must know four things: (1) that “an ofﬁcer, employee or
other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to

209

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2006).

210

Id.; see also WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2) (2006) (“A lawyer shall . . .
reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be
accomplished.”).
211

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY, § 387 (1958).

212

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 73, cmt. B (2000).

213

Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.1 (West 1986).

214

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(g) (2006).
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act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation:” (2) “that is a
violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which
reasonably might be imputed to the organization;” (3) that the violation of a
legal obligation or violation of law “reasonably might be imputed to the
organization . . . ;” and (4) the violation is “likely to result in substantial injury to
the organization . . .”215
The question is what does that really mean? What must a lawyer know? Two
types of events fall within Rule 1.13(b). Actions or inactions by a person associated
with the organization that is either (1) “a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization;” or (2) “a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to
the organization.”216 The former type of activity generally involves the “breach of a
constituent’s ﬁduciary duty to the organization, such as usurpation of a corporate
opportunity or self-dealing.”217 The latter type of activity “refers to conduct for
which an organization would be traditionally responsible under the common
law doctrine of ‘respondeat superior’ or by operation of statute or regulation.”218
Given the proliferation of federal and state laws that allow for the recovery of
erroneously paid government funds from the provider itself, which is likely an
organization, lawyers need to be especially mindful of the possibility the health
care organization the lawyer represents does not get into legal hot water.219
How will a lawyer know? A common scenario will be that an organization’s
lawyer is asked for an opinion about one of the organization’s proposed activities.
The lawyer opines that the proposal will involve either actions by a constituent
that are a violation of legal obligations owed to the organization or a violation
of law which might reasonably be imputed to the organization, and, therefore,
taking the proposed action would be ill-advised. The lawyer’s advice is rejected by

215

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2006).

216

Id.

217

Mary C. Daly, Avoiding the Ethical Pitfall of Misidentifying the Organizational Client, 1319
PLI/CORP. 721, 725-26 (1997).
218

Id. at 726.

219

See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-207 (2008) (“the department [of Health] may through
appropriate action recover any incorrect payment of medical assistance under this chapter on behalf
of a recipient . . . . Any recovery shall be prorated to the federal government in proportion to the
amount it contributed . . . .”); see also WY Rules and Regulations HLTH MDCD Ch. 7 s 31
(“Recovery of excess payments or overpayments.”) and Ch. 16 (“Medicaid Program Integrity.”).
The State is required by federal law to attempt to recover overpayments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (1984)
(“[W]hen an overpayment [of Medicaid funds] is discovered, which was made by a State to a person
or other entity, the State shall have a period of 60 days in which to recover or attempt to recover
such overpayment . . .”).
The foregoing are just a few of the myriad laws and regulations, at both the state and federal
level, which permit or require recovery from a provider of medical services (a provider is often an
organization, such as a hospital, nursing home, or group of HCWs) of erroneously paid government funds.
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the constituent(s) with whom the lawyer is interacting. Another common scenario
is that a lawyer is asked to investigate certain activity and learns of on-going,
improper activity, such as improper billing for and receipt of state and/or federal
funds for medical services, by someone associated with the organization. Finally,
a lawyer who has an on-going relationship with an organizational client may
become aware of improper actions just because of the lawyer’s general familiarity
with how the organization operates. However the lawyer comes to “know,” once
he or she does, the question for the lawyer is “What next?” The question is a
tough one, but the Rules help to answer it by clarifying that the lawyer’s ultimate
duty is to the organization, not its constituents, regardless of the constituent’s
position in the organization.
If a lawyer “knows” the foregoing, i.e., that an individual associated with an
organization is about to embark on or has already embarked on a course of conduct
which is in violation of the individual’s obligations to the organization or which is
illegal and may be imputed to the organization, and the injury to the organization
will be substantial, the lawyer must act. He or she “shall,” says the Rule, “proceed
as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.”220 This language
makes the organization’s primacy clear. The lawyer “shall” act in the best interest
of “the organization,” even at the expense of the interests of the individual(s) who
may control it. The Rule then articulates several factors for the lawyer to consider
in deciding what to do:
In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due
consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer’s representation, the
responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation
of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning
such matters and any other relevant considerations.221
While the lawyer’s primary obligation is to protect the organization, the
lawyer must act with caution. “Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize
disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to
the representation to persons outside the organization.”222 The emphasis on not
disclosing otherwise conﬁdential information outside the organization is a natural
outgrowth of a lawyer’s general obligation not to reveal “conﬁdential information
relating to the representation.”223 The idea is that a lawyer can, and should, take
steps within the organization to protect the best interests of the organization,
while at the same time preserving the client’s conﬁdences.

220

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2006).

221

Id. (emphasis added).

222

Id.

223

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006).
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In addition to the Rule’s general directive to “minimize disruption of
the organization,” the Rule provides speciﬁc ideas. Acting in the best interest
of an organization “may include” the following: First, the lawyer may ask for
“reconsideration of the matter.”224 The persons to ask, of course, are the persons,
the constituents, in the words of the Rule, who are authorized to act on behalf
of the organization.225 They are the persons who made the decision in question,
and they are the persons who can change it. If that does not work, the second
recommended step is that the lawyer “advis[e] that a separate legal opinion on the
matter be sought for presentation to appropriate authority in the organization.”226
Once again, the advice to ask for reconsideration should be given to the constituent
or constituents authorized to act on behalf of the organization. If that advice falls
on deaf ears, the third suggestion is to “refer[] the matter to higher authority in
the organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral
to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined
by applicable law.”227 Who is a “higher authority” depends on with whom the lawyer
has been interacting and, as the Rule notes, “applicable law.” The ABA’s new Model
Rules, adopted in 2002 substantially revised Rule 1.13, including paragraphs (b)
through (d). Among other things, the ABA’s Rules presume that attorneys should
refer the matter to a higher authority, and, under some circumstances, ABA Rule
1.13(c) permits attorneys to disclose otherwise conﬁdential client information.228
Those changes were not adopted when the Wyoming Rules were modiﬁed in
2005.229
If, for example, the organization is a corporation and the “authorized
constituent” with whom the corporation’s lawyer has been dealing is a vicepresident, the CEO is obviously a higher authority. If the CEO is the authorized
constituent, the “higher authority,” according to Wyoming law, the applicable
law, is the board of directors, which has ultimate authority over the corporation.230
If the organization is a limited liability company, governance is vested in its
members.”231 Whatever the entity, the ultimate control will be established by
“applicable law,” and the lawyer better know that law.

224

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b)(1) (2006).

225

See John M. Burman, Representing Organizations: Part I, Who is the Client, and With whom
Should the Lawyer Interact? XXV. WYOMING LAWYER at 39-41 (April 2002).
226

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b)(2) (2006).

227

Id. at R. 1.13(b)(3).

228

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) through (d) (2008).

229

See WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2006).

230

By law, a corporation is governed by its board of directors. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-801(a)

(2008).
231

Id. at § 17-16-801.
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If asking for reconsideration, requesting a second opinion, and referring the
matter to a higher authority do not succeed in diverting the organization from a
harmful course of conduct, paragraph 1.13(c) provides further guidance. If “the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization” is unwilling to alter
the organization’s conduct, and the conduct is “clearly a violation of law and is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign in
accordance with Rule 1.16” [“Declining or terminating representation”].232 The
language of this paragraph is more restrictive than the language of paragraph (b),
which requires the lawyer to blow the whistle. While a lawyer must blow the
whistle when an act or proposed act is “a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law,” paragraph (c) requires an action which is
“clearly a violation of law.” The “substantial injury” language of paragraph (c) is
the same as the language of paragraph (b). Accordingly, when the action is “clearly
a violation of law” a lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16233 (the “may
resign” standard may become a shall resign if the lawyer’s continued representation
of the organization “will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
or other law.”234). While withdrawal likely satisﬁes the lawyer’s ethical duty, it may
be an empty gesture. The client may not be deterred from the conduct which led
to the lawyer blowing the whistle, and, ultimately, the lawyer’s withdrawing. The
issue which then arises is whether the lawyer may disclose the now former client’s
intended conduct.
A lawyer whose former (or current) client intends to pursue an illegal or
otherwise improper course of conduct is caught in a bind, between two potentially
conﬂicting ethical and legal duties. On the one hand, a lawyer “shall not counsel
a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal
or fraudulent.”235 Further, a lawyer must withdraw from representation of a client
if “the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
or other law.”236 On the other, a lawyer has an obligation of conﬁdentiality to
both current and former clients and may not use or reveal any “conﬁdential
information relating to the representation” of a current237 or former client.”238 A
lawyer may not, therefore, simply withdraw and disclose the reasons for doing so.
There is authority, however, to support a lawyer making a “noisy withdrawal,” in
which the lawyer communicates, at least implicitly, the fact and the reasons for

232

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c) (2006) (emphasis added).

233

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2006) (Paragraph (a) of Rule 1.16 requires
withdrawal in certain circumstances. Paragraph (b) permits withdrawal in others.).
234

Id. at R. 1.16(a)(1).

235

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2006).

236

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2006).

237

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006).

238

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) (2006).
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withdrawing.”239 That authority is considerably stronger in Wyoming because of
a Wyoming’s lenient rule on disclosing conﬁdential information.240
As discussed in detail above,241 when it is “apparent” to an organization’s lawyer
that the interests of the organization and its constituents “are adverse,” the lawyer
must “explain the identity of the client . . . [and] that the organization’s interests
are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.”242 If the
constituent with whom the lawyer is interacting does not have a lawyer, the only
advice the lawyer may give the individual, which the lawyer should give, is that
the individual should obtain counsel.243 If the constituent has counsel, the lawyer
may not communicate about the matter with the individual “unless the lawyer has
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.”244
Requiring a lawyer to act to take reasonable steps to protect an organization’s
best interests is consistent with the Rules’ general requirement that “[a] lawyer
shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent . . .”245 It is also consistent with the ethical
mandate that a lawyer “shall withdraw from the representation of a client if . . .
the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
or other law.”246 Despite these clear directives, a lawyer must remember that
the duty of conﬁdentiality always applies and a lawyer’s withdrawal from
representing a client does not mean that the lawyer may disclose information
about the client’s conduct.247

239

Valerie Breslin & Jeff Dooley, Whistleblowing v. Conﬁdentiality: Can Circumstances Mandate
Attorneys To Expose Their Clients, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 719, 720-22 (2002).
240

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006) (“A lawyer may reveal such information
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . .to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act.”).
241

See supra notes 240 through 245 and accompanying text.

242

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d) (2006).

243
WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2006) (“In dealing on behalf of a client with
a person who is not represented by counsel . . . [t]he lawyer shall not give legal advice to an
unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel. “) (emphasis added).
244

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2006).

245

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2006).

246

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2006).

247

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c)(1) & (2) (2006) (“A lawyer who has formerly
represented a client in a matter . . . shall not thereafter . . .[u]se information relating to the
representation to the disadvantage of the former client . . . or . . . [r]eveal information relating to the
representation . . .”); see also WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, cmt. [25] (2006) (“The duty
of conﬁdentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.”).
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2. Disclosing the Information Which Led to Whistle-Blowing.
A lawyer’s ethical duty of conﬁdentiality is broad: “A lawyer shall not reveal
conﬁdential information relating to representation of a client unless the client
makes an informed decision, the disclosures is impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”248
Since it is unlikely that an organization will decide to allow its lawyer to disclose
the information which triggered the lawyer’s whistle-blowing obligation, the
question becomes is the lawyer permitted to disclose the information pursuant
to “paragraph (b),” or is the lawyer required to remain mute, knowing that the
proposed action may cause injury, either physical or otherwise, to third parties?
In answering this question, Wyoming has taken a much different approach than
the ABA.
When it comes to personal injury, the ABA suggests restricting a lawyer’s
disclosure of conﬁdential information to circumstances where the lawyer
“reasonably believes”249 that disclosure is necessary to prevent “reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily injury.”250 The ABA also permits disclosure when a
lawyer “reasonably believes” disclosure is “necessary . . . to prevent the client from
committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury
to the ﬁnancial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the
client has used or is using the lawyer’s services;251 Also, in a signiﬁcant departure
from the policy that a lawyer may only disclose conﬁdential client information to
prevent future crimes, the ABA now recommends that lawyers be allowed to reveal
conﬁdential client information about prior client actions in some circumstances.
Subparagraph (b)(3) permits disclosure when a lawyer “reasonably believes” that
disclosure is “necessary . . . to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the
ﬁnancial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has
resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which
the client has used the lawyer’s services;252 The use of the words “mitigate [or]
rectify,” and “has resulted” make the rule’s applicability to past acts clear. One
simply cannot “mitigate [or] rectify” future acts, and the use of the past-tense,
“has resulted,” obviously applies to the past, not the future. Finally, the ABA
has added a disclosure provision to Rule 1.13 (“Organization as client”). If a
lawyer blows the whistle inside an organization (and has referred the matter to
the “highest authority that can act on behalf of an organization [and it] insists

248

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006).

249

“Reasonable belief ” is a deﬁned term. It means: “that the lawyer believes the matter in
question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT, R. 1.0(3) (2008).
250

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.6(b)(1) (2008).

251

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.6(b)(2).

252

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.6(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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upon or fails to address [a matter] . . . that is clearly a violation of law,” a lawyer
may disclose information outside the organization if: (1) the lawyer “reasonably
believes” (2) “that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury
to the organization.”253
The Wyoming Rules, however, take a much different approach, permitting
disclosure of otherwise conﬁdential information “to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act.”254 In some ways, that standard is more liberal than the ABA’s standard with
respect to future acts. It does not, however, allow disclosure of past acts, ever, and
is, in that way, more restrictive than the ABA’s Rule.
Wyoming is not alone in rejecting the ABA’s view. It is one of approximately
thirty-three jurisdictions which have adopted the view that a lawyer may disclose
otherwise conﬁdential information to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act.255 (By contrast, eighteen jurisdictions have adopted the ABA’s view
and permit disclosure only when a client’s intended criminal act will result in
substantial harm or death.256 Another eleven jurisdictions require disclosure to
253

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R.1.13(c) (2008).

254

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006).

255

Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1); see also Arkansas (ARK. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1));
California (CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-100(B)); Colorado (COLO. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)); Idaho (IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); Indiana (IND. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); Iowa (IOWA CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-101 (C)(3)); Kansas
(KAN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1);R. 226); Maine (ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 3.6 (h)(4)); Michigan (MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (c)(4)); Minnesota (MINN.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(3)); Mississippi (MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(b)(2)); Nebraska (NEB. CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT DR. 4-101 (C)(3));New York (N.Y. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT DR. 4-101 C. 3); North Carolina (N.C. R BAR Ch 2, R. 1.6 (b)(2)); Ohio (OHIO
CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT DR. 4-101 (C)(3)); Oklahoma (OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(b)(2)(i)); Oregon (OR. CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT DR. 4-101 (C)(3)); South Carolina (S.C. R A
CT R. 407, S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); Tennessee (TENN. S CT RULE 8, TENN.
CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT DR. 4-101 (C)(3)); Washington (WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 (b)(2)); and West Virginia (W. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)). In addition,
eleven states require the disclosure of information necessary to prevent substantial bodily harm or
death, and permit a lawyer to disclose information relating to other crimes. See, Arizona (ARIZ. ST
S CT R. 42, ARIZ. CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT ER. 1.6 (b)); Connecticut (CONN. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)); Florida (FLA. ST BAR R. 4-1.6 (b)(1)); Illinois (ILL. S CT RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)); Nevada (NEV. S CT R. 1.6 (c)); New Jersey (N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 (b)(1)); North Dakota (N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)); Texas (TEX. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05 (e)); Vermont (VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); Virginia
(VA R S CT PT 6 S 2, VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (c)(1)); and Wisconsin (WIS RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 20:1.6 (b)).
256

The eighteen jurisdictions are: Alabama (ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1));
Alaska (ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); Delaware (DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R.1.6 (b)(1)); District of Columbia (D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.1.6 (c)(1)); Georgia (GA.
BAR R. 4-102. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)(ii)); Hawaii (HAW. S CT EX A RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (c)(1)); Kentucky (KY. ST S CT R. 3.130, RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
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prevent serious bodily harm or death, and they permit disclosure of information
to prevent lesser crimes.257 Allowing disclosure of conﬁdential information to
prevent a “criminal act” will certainly permit an organization’s lawyer to disclose
information to prevent the organization from committing a crime. Under no
circumstances, however, may a Wyoming lawyer disclose a client’s past conduct.
The exception is for future conduct because one can prevent it, not past crimes.
A “lawyer may disclose otherwise conﬁdential information in order to prevent
the criminal act which the lawyer reasonably believes is intended by the client.
[But i]t is very difﬁcult for a lawyer to ‘know’ when such a purpose will actually
be carried out for the client may have a change of mind.”258 Accordingly, while
a Wyoming lawyer may disclose a client’s intent to commit a future crime, he or
she never has an ethical duty under Rule 1.6 (which governs conﬁdentiality of
information) to disclose. Accordingly:
A lawyer’s decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b)
does not violate this Rule. Disclosure may be required, however,
by other rules. Some rules require disclosure only if such disclosure
would be permitted by paragraph (b). See Rules 1.2(d), 4.1(b),
8.1 and 8.3. Rule 3.3, conversely, requires disclosure in some
circumstances regardless of whether such disclosure is permitted
by this Rule. See Rule 3.3(c).259
Regardless of whether a Wyoming lawyer has an ethical duty to disclose, he
or she may have a tort duty to disclose when a client intends to commit a crime
which will result in substantial bodily harm or death to an identiﬁable victim.260

R. 1.6 (b)(1)); Louisiana (L.A. ST BAR ART 16, L.A. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1));
Maryland (MD. R CTS J & ATTYS RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); Massachusetts (MASS.
S CT R. 3:07, Mass. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); Missouri (MO. R RULE 4, RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6 (b)(1)); Montana (MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)): New
Hampshire (N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); New Mexico (N.M. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 16-106 B. (“a lawyer should reveal”)); Pennsylvania (PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R.1.6 (c)(1)); Rhode Island (R.I. R S CT ART V RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); South
Dakota (S.D. ST T. 16, Ch 16-18, APP, RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); and Utah (UT.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)).
257
Arizona (ARIZ. ST S CT RULE 42 RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT ER. 1.6 (b)&(c)); Connecticut
(CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)&(c)); Florida (FLA. ST BAR R. 4-1.6 (b)(1)); Illinois
(ILL. ST S CT RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)&(c)(3)); Nevada (NEV. ST S CT R. 1.6(b) 2));
New Jersey (N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); North Dakota (N.D. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (c)); Texas (TEX. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(e)); Vermont (VT. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (b)(1)); Virginia (VA. R S CT PT 6 S 2, RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6
(c)(1); and Wisconsin (WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT SCR. 20:1.6 (b)).
258

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [12] (2006).

259

Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. [20].

260

See, e.g., John M. Burman, An Attorney’s Duty to Warn, Vol 30, No.1, WYOMING LAWYER
(February 2007).
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In sum, withdrawing from representation of an organization does not free a
lawyer from the duty of conﬁdentiality discussed above as a lawyer owes a similar
duty not to use or reveal conﬁdential information regarding a former client261 or
a former prospective client.262 The commentary263 to Rule 1.6 explains the effect
of withdrawal on a lawyer’s conﬁdentiality obligation:
After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making
disclosure of the client’s conﬁdences, except as otherwise
permitted in Rule 1.6. Neither this Rule [1.6] nor Rule 1.8(b) nor
Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of
withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disafﬁrm any
opinion, document, afﬁrmation, or the like. Where the client is an
organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether contemplated
conduct will actually be carried out by the organization. Where
necessary to guide conduct in connection with this Rule, the
lawyer may make inquiry within the organization as indicated in
Rule 1.13(b).264
The commentary makes it clear that the Rule contemplates giving notice of
the fact of withdrawal. The more difﬁcult question is what does it mean to and
how should a lawyer “disafﬁrm any opinion, document, afﬁrmation, or the like?”
The answer depends on the context.
When a lawyer enters an appearance in a tribunal265 on behalf of a client,
the rules change. The lawyer now owes his or her highest duty to the tribunal.
The lawyer must not, among other things, “make a false statement of fact or law
. . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority . . . known to the lawyer to be
directly adverse to the position of the client . . . [or] offer evidence the lawyer
knows to be false.”266 In addition, if the lawyer has offered evidence which the
lawyer subsequently learns to be false, the lawyer “shall take reasonable remedial
measures” to correct the situation.267 Such measures begin with the lawyer seeking

261
WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c) (2006); see also WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 cmt.[25] (“The duty of conﬁdentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has
terminated.”).
262

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18(b) (2006).

263

The comments which accompany each rule “explain and illustrate the meaning and purpose
of the Rule.” WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. Scope [20] (2006).
264

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [21] (2006) (emphasis added).

265

“Tribunal” means “a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative
body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity.” WYO. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.0(n) (2006).
266

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1), (2), & (4) (2006).

267

Id. at R. 3.3(a)(3).
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to persuade the client to correct the falsity.268 If that fails, the lawyer may seek to
withdraw from the representation if doing so “will undo the effect of the false
evidence.”269 If withdrawal will not work either, the lawyer “must make such
disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even
if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise would be
protected by Rule 1.6 [the rule on conﬁdentiality].”270 This duty to disclose is
much different than a lawyer’s general duty of conﬁdentiality, which overrides the
lawyer’s duties to other third parties.271 A lawyer’s duties to a tribunal, however,
have primacy.
A lawyer’s duties to the tribunal “apply even if compliance requires disclosure
of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.”272 This means that a “lawyer
shall not knowingly . . . fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”273 Accordingly, if the lawyer has
ﬁled a pleading with a tribunal that the lawyer later learns contains a material
misstatement of fact or law, or that omits a material fact, the lawyer must correct
or supplement the pleading, or disaﬁrm it. Doing so is required by Rule 3.3
(“Candor to the tribunal”).274 The disclosure of otherwise conﬁdential information,

268

Id. at R. 3.3 cmt. [10].

269

Id.

270

Id. Although the ethical duty applies to criminal defense lawyers, it may be qualiﬁed by the
client’s Constitutional rights: “The general rule—that an advocate must disclose the existence of
perjury with respect to a material fact, even that of a client—applies to defense counsel in criminal
cases . . . . However, the deﬁnition of the lawyer’s ethical duty in such a situation may be qualiﬁed
by constitutional provisions for due process and the right to counsel in criminal cases. “ Id.; but see
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (“It was not a violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel for his attorney to threaten to withdraw if client committed
perjury.”).
271
See, e.g., WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2006) (A lawyer shall not “fail to
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”).
272

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2006).

273

Id. at R. 3.3(a)(1).

274

The lawyer may also have a problem with Rule 11 (of the Wyoming Rules of Civil
Procedure). The problem is that a lawyer who signs a pleading which is ﬁled with the court (which
is a tribunal) is certifying that the document is: (1) not submitted for any improper purpose;
(2) the legal contentions in the document are “warranted;” and (3) the factual allegations have
evidentiary support. WYO. R. CIV. P. 11(b). If that turns out to be incorrect, the signing lawyer may
be sanctioned. Id. at R. 11(c).
In Wyoming, the requirements of Rule 11 have been adopted as part of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(c) (2006) (“The signature of an attorney
constitutes a certiﬁcate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other court document;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modiﬁcation, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”).
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however, “should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
accomplish the purpose.”275
Finally, a lawyer who has entered an appearance in a court may not withdraw
without the permission of the court, regardless of the client’s actions.276 The lawyer
must receive the court’s permission even if the Rules would otherwise require
the lawyer to terminate the representation because of the severity of the client’s
conduct.277 The lawyer who wishes to withdraw, and who is ethically obligated to
withdraw because of a client’s conduct, may not tell all. Instead, the lawyer must
be careful not to disclose too much information, even information which would
clearly establish the impropriety of the client’s actions and the appropriateness of
the lawyer’s request to withdraw since the lawyer shill owes a duty of conﬁdentiality
to the client and the disclosure must be limited to that which is “necessary.” The
lawyer should resist the temptation to detail the reasons for seeking to withdraw,
and the court should not require the lawyer to specify the reasons:
Difﬁculty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the
client’s demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional
conduct. The court may request an explanation for the
withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep conﬁdential
the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer’s
statement that professional considerations require termination of the
representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufﬁcient. Lawyers
should be mindful of their obligations to both clients and the
court under Rules 1.6 [conﬁdentiality] and 3.3 [“Candor to the
tribunal”].278
If the matter is not in litigation and the lawyer has not entered an appearance,
Rule 3.3, which requires candor to the tribunal, will not apply, although the Rule
on conﬁdentiality (1.6) will. Withdrawal from the representation will be governed
by Rule 1.16 (“Declining or terminating representation”) Paragraph (a) of the Rule
requires termination of the representation if continued representation “will result
in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.”279 Paragraph (b)
275

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. [19] (2006).

276

See, e.g., UNIFORM RULES FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF WYO., R. 102(c) (2007) (“Counsel
will not be permitted to withdraw from a case except upon court order.”) The rule applies in circuit
court, as well. UNIFORM RULES FOR THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF WYO., R. 1.02 (2007) (“The Uniform
Rules for the District Courts of Wyoming shall govern the practice before the circuit courts of
Wyoming.”).
277
WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2006) (“A lawyer must comply with applicable
law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When
ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause
for terminating the representation.”).
278

Id. at R. 1.16 cmt. [3] (emphasis added).

279

Id. at R. 1.16(a)(1).
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permits termination for a variety of reasons, including when “the client persists
in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably
believes is criminal or fraudulent,”280 or “the client has used the lawyer’s services
to perpetrate a crime or fraud.”281 Conduct which gives rise to a lawyer’s duty
to blow the whistle will likely fall under either the mandatory or the permissive
withdrawal provisions, and if the attorney has not entered an appearance, those
provisions will control withdrawal.
A lawyer’s whistle-blowing duty to an organization is the reciprocal of the
lawyer’s obligation to ensure that constituent(s) whose conduct may lead to liability
for the organization know that the organization’s lawyer does not represent them.
Almost by deﬁnition, when a lawyer has a duty to blow the whistle, the interests
of the constituent(s) and the organization are very much in conﬂict. The Rules
anticipate such a conﬂict and require an organizational lawyer to take steps to
avoid that conﬂict.282
Before disclosing conﬁdential information, a lawyer has another duty, the duty
to communicate with the client about the lawyer’s proposed actions and whether
the client wishes to act to eliminate the need for the attorney’s disclosure.283 The
reason is that a client, not the client’s lawyer, is authorized to make decisions
about the objectives of the representation, and the lawyer “shall abide” by those
decisions.284 Further, the lawyer “shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued.”285 Accordingly, whether disclosing information is
an objective or a means, the lawyer has a duty to consult with the client about
potential disclosure and its possible effects. Furthermore, a lawyer has a duty
to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.”286 The client thus needs
to make such an informed decision about whether to act to eliminate the need
for disclosure by the lawyer, or to do nothing, knowing the lawyer will disclose
the information.

280

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2006).

281

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(3) (2006).

282

Id. at R. 1.16.

283

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt.[19] (2006) (“Where practicable, the lawyer
should ﬁrst seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure.”).
284

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2006).

285

Id.; see also WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2) (2006) (“A lawyer shall . . .
reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be
accomplished;”).
286

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2006).
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Requiring a lawyer to consult with a client before disclosure appears to
be effective. In the only study which has been done on the efﬁcacy of lawyers
trying to dissuade their clients from committing violent acts, lawyer suasion was
found to be very effective with individual clients who had told their lawyers of
their intentions to commit violent crimes.287 It should be similarly effective with
organizational clients. It may be more effective as the organization’s ultimate
decision-maker may not have been involved in the original decision and may be
very pleased to be able to correct the proposed action and avoid potential legal
liability for the organization.
The lawyer’s ethical duties are clear. The lawyer represents the organization,
and he or she must act to protect it when the lawyer knows that the organization
may be substantially harmed by the actions or inactions of an individual within or
associated with the organization. Similarly, the lawyer must take care not to create
the impression that the lawyer represents the individuals who work for or with the
organization. This obligation means that the lawyer must explain his or her role
to the individuals with whom the lawyer is interacting.
When all is said and done, a lawyer in Wyoming has discretion to reveal
information when the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure is necessary to prevent
the client from committing “a criminal act.”288 That will often permit a lawyer
for an organization to disclose at least some of the conduct which has given rise
to the lawyer’s obligation to blow the whistle to protect the best interests of the
organization. A disclosure outside the organization, however, must be limited. It
“should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish
the purpose.”289

3. The Legal Framework
A lawyer owes both ethical and legal duties to a client. When it comes to
blowing the whistle, a Wyoming lawyer’s ethical and legal duties are virtually
identical.

287
A 1993 study of New Jersey lawyers showed both that lawyers confront the issue of clients
intending violent criminal action fairly often, and that the lawyers are generally successful in
persuading the client not to commit the acts. Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A
Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 111–12
(1994). First, Professor Levin found that sixty-seven lawyers out of 776 responding lawyers reported
that they had, at least once in their careers, reasonably believed that a client intended to commit
future crime which would cause serious injury to another. Second, the study found that lawyers who
reasonably believed that their clients were going to seriously harm a third party tried to convince the
clients not to do so. Id. at 117. The lawyers believed they had been successful in persuading their
clients not to commit the crimes 92.4% of the time. Id.
288

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006).

289

Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. [19].

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2008

53

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 8 [2008], No. 2, Art. 2

426

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 8

The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers mirrors the ethical
duty described above:
If a lawyer representing an organization knows of circumstances
indicating that a constituent of the organization has engaged in
action or intends to act in a way that violates a legal obligation to
the organization that will likely cause substantial injury to it, or
that reasonably can be foreseen to be imputable to the organization
. . . the lawyer must proceed in what the lawyer reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the organization.290
The Restatement suggests the same steps as Wyoming’s Rule 1.13(b). First,
the lawyer may “ask the constituent to reconsider” the proposed action.291 Second,
the lawyer may “recommend that a second legal opinion be sought.”292 Third,
the lawyer may “seek review by appropriate supervisory authority within the
organization, including . . . the highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization.”293 Blowing the whistle on constituent wrong-doing is not, however,
all an organizational lawyer must do.
As a general matter, a lawyer owes every client an ethical duty of competence,
which “requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”294 The legal duty is similar. A lawyer
is held to the standard of “a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer . . . .”295
The legal duties a lawyer owes to an organizational client mirror the lawyer’s
ethical duties. The Wyoming Supreme Court addressed an organizational lawyer’s
legal duties in Bowen v. Smith.296 In that case, minority shareholders sued the
corporation’s lawyers. Although the history leading up to and culminating in the
suit is lengthy and complex, the salient facts are both simple and important. The
corporation retained a law ﬁrm, at the sole expense of the majority shareholder,
to represent it in litigation. The litigation was resolved through a cash settlement
favorable to the corporation. The majority and minority shareholders then disagreed
about the division of the settlement proceeds, a dispute which, itself, ultimately
ended in litigation. In that dispute, the corporation’s former law ﬁrm represented
the majority shareholder. While the suit over the division of the settlement

290

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 96 (2) (2000).

291

Id. at § 96(3).

292

Id.

293

Id.

294

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1.(2006).

295

Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1993).

296

Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186 (Wyo. 1992) overturned in part on other grounds, In re
Estate of Drwenski, 83 P.3d 457, 463 (Wyo.2004).
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proceeds was pending, the minority shareholders sued the corporation’s former
law ﬁrm, the ﬁrm which was then representing the majority shareholder. The trial
court granted the law ﬁrm’s motion for summary judgment. The judgment was
upheld on appeal.
The minority shareholders’ suit against the corporation’s former law ﬁrm was
premised on the notion that an attorney-client relationship had existed between
the corporation’s law ﬁrm and the corporation’s minority shareholders.297 The
minority shareholders thus asserted claims against the ﬁrm for breach of ﬁduciary
duty; conspiracy; breach of contract; fraud; malpractice; and punitive damages.298
Cutting through the cluster of charges and counter-charges, the supreme court
held that the key was “one simple issue.”299 That is, whether “representation of
the parent corporation . . . by attorneys employed in the interest of the majority
shareholder . . . create[d] an attorney/client relationship with the minority
shareholders in the same corporation.”300 The answer, said the court, was no:
“[T]he law ﬁrm was not representing the minority shareholders and violated
no ﬁduciary relationship to them.”301 Furthermore, as it should have been, “the
settlement [had been] approved by the board of directors of the corporation . . . .”302
The law ﬁrm, in other words, represented the corporation, the organization, to
which it owed ethical and legal duties, and not the individual shareholders who
comprise it, the constituents. The Wyoming view is in accord with the prevailing
principle that a lawyer for an organization owes legal duties to the organization,
and not to the organization’s constituents.303
Bowen vs. Smith is premised on a fundamental principle of corporate law.
A corporation is an “independent entity” which must be “distinguished from
individual shareholders.”304 The same principle should apply to a professional
corporation of HCWs. Not only is that distinction well-established in law, it
is, said the court, a “principle” of the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 1.13 [“Organization as client”], in particular.305 The ultimate question for
the court, therefore, was whether the law ﬁrm had fulﬁlled its duties to its client,
the corporation, not whether the law ﬁrm was looking out for the interests of the
shareholders, who were non-clients. The answer, said the court, was yes: “[t]he
parent corporation was faithfully and fully represented by the law ﬁrm . . . .”306
297

Bowden, 838 P.2d at 187 n.1.

298

Id.

299

Id. at 189.

300

Id.

301

Id. at 187.

302

Bowden, 838 P.2d at 190.

303

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 96(1) (2000).

304

Bowden, 838 P.2d at 193.

305

Id.

306

Id.
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While Bowen remains good law, a lawyer who represents an organization
must be careful not to blur the line between representing the organization and
the constituents within it. The problem is that in Wyoming, the attorney-client
relationship is a contractual one. It may arise by express agreement of the parties,
or it “may be implied from the conduct of the parties.”307 When a constituent
claims an attorney-client relationship existed with both the organization and the
constituent, the question for a reviewing court will be whether the constituent
reasonably believed the lawyer represented him or her individually, and “the
burden of proof to show that is was unreasonable for a client to believe that an
attorney-client relationship existed . . . has to rest with the attorney.”308
One of the difﬁculties an organizational lawyer faces is that he or she “may
also represent any of its directors, ofﬁcers, employees, members, shareholders
or other constituents” so long as the dual representation does not involve an
impermissible conﬂict of interest.309 So long as no problems arise, it is unlikely
for an impermissible conﬂict to prevent dual representation of a constituent and
the organization. When the obligation to blow the whistle arises, however, it is
extremely likely that the circumstances which gave rise to that obligation will be
the result of an adverse relationship between the constituent(s) involved and the
organization.310 When that occurs, having an attorney-client relationship with
both an organization and some of its constituents will likely place the lawyer in
an impossible conﬂict, one which will require the lawyer’s complete withdrawal
from representing either the organization or its constituents.311
The frequency and likelihood of an organizational constituent reasonably
believing that the organization’s lawyer also represents that individual is the reason
for the organizational attorney’s ethical duty to be aware of when the organization’s
interests and those of a constituent begin to diverge, and the further duty of
the lawyer to clarify the identity of the client when that occurs.312 It is critical,
therefore, that the lawyer not create the impression in the minds of constituents
that the lawyer represents them, as well as the organization.

307

Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Wyo. 1980), cert den. 446 U.S. 904; see also Carlson
v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344, 347 (Wyo. 1988).
308

Carlson, 751 P.2d at 348 (emphasis added).

309

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d) (2006).

310

The issue of conﬂicts between the interests of constituents and the organization is discussed
in detail at notes 221 through 228, infra, and accompanying text.
311

Some conﬂicts may not be waived. The question is, inter alia, whether the lawyer with
the conﬂict “reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected.” WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1) (2006). In addition,
the clients must “make[ ] an informed decision to waive the conﬂict, in writing signed by the client.”
Id. at R. 1.7(b)(4).
312

WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d) (2006).
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4. Special Considerations for Lawyers Who Represent HCWs or Health
Care Organizations
When the client is a HCW or an organization which provides health care
and receives federal funds (virtually all health care providers, whether individual
HCWs or health care organizations, receive Medicare or Medicaid payments,
which include federal funds), the lawyer needs to be aware of federal law which
arguably overrides a lawyer’s general ethical and legal obligations of conﬁdentiality,
even with respect to past acts. A little known provision of the Social Security Act
has the potential to fundamentally alter a lawyer’s responsibility to a health care
client:
Whoever . . . having knowledge of the occurrence of any event
affecting (A) his initial or continued right to any such beneﬁt
or payment, or (B) the initial or continued right to any such
beneﬁt or payment of any other individual in whose behalf he
has applied for or is receiving such beneﬁt or payment, conceals
or fails to disclose such event with an intent fraudulently to secure
such beneﬁt or payment either in a greater amount or quantity
than is due or when no such beneﬁt or payment is authorized [is
guilty of a felony].313
Whether a lawyer who represents a provider of health care services, whether
an individual HCW or an organization, who learns that the provider has received
federal funds in excess of that to which the provider is entitled falls under the
mandate of the statute is not clear. Nevertheless, its plain language—“whoever”—
could be construed by a zealous federal prosecutor to apply to a health lawyer and
effectively force him or her to inform on the lawyer’s client. Such a result would
dramatically change the traditional relationship between a client, who consults a
lawyer for legal assistance, and the lawyer, who would become the client’s worst
nightmare (a government informant), instead of a conﬁdant who will zealously
represent the client’s interests.
Thus far, no reported cases say that a lawyer falls within the purview of the
above statute.314 There are also many potential defenses should such a case arise.
Lawyers who represent health care providers who receive federal funds, however,

313

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).

314

See R.J. NESSIM, Health Care Disclosure Statute: What Does It Mean? 13 CRIMINAL JUSTICE
34 (Winter 1999). For an extensive discussion of a health care lawyer’s duty to report, see, BEST
PRACTICES HANDBOOK IN ADVISING CLIENTS ON FRAUD & ABUSE ISSUES, Chapters 1 & 2 (American
Health Lawyers Association 1999); see also Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response to the Compelled Involuntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 897, 897 (2006) (“’[T]he [corporate] attorney-client privilege is under attack today as never
before.’”).
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need to be aware of the law and its potential applicability and advise their clients
accordingly.
Lawyers who represent HCWs, health care organizations, or both, also need
to be familiar with and advise their clients about complying with federal fraud and
abuse laws. In particular, the so-called STARK and anti–kickback laws should be of
concern. While similar in some respects, “[t]he Stark II exceptions unfortunately
are sufﬁciently different from the anti-kickback law that a transaction can be valid
under one and invalid under the other.”315 Both laws apply when a HCW or a
health care organization provide “ancillary” services, such as laboratory or other
types of tests, or referrals to other HCWs or organizations.
When STARK was ﬁrst enacted in 1989 it applied only to “Medicare referrals
for clinical laboratory services.”316 In 1993, STARK was “signiﬁcantly modiﬁed,”317
and became STARK II. As modiﬁed, “Stark II created a blanket prohibition on
physician Medicare and Medicaid referrals.”318
After STARK became law, “the Health Care Financing Administration
(“HCFA”) published proposed regulations interpreting it on March 11, 1992 and
ﬁnal regulations on August 14, 1995 (60 Fed. Reg. 41914).”319 After the 1993
amendments became law:
HCFA published proposed regulations interpreting Stark II on
January 9, 1998 (63 Fed. Reg. 1659) and published Phase I of
the ﬁnal regulations of Stark II on January 4, 2001 (66 Fed.
Reg. 856). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(“CMS”)320 published Phase II of the ﬁnal regulations of Stark
II on March 26, 2004 (69 Fed. Reg. 16054). The Phase II ﬁnal

315

4 COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS § 57:199, Part VIII. Health Care Beneﬁts, Chapter 57.
Other Legal Issues Affecting Health Care Plans, XI. Fraud and Abuse in Health Care Transactions,
E. Other Federal Self-Referral Law (Stark Acts) (2008) (“The Stark II exceptions unfortunately
are sufﬁciently different from the anti-kickback law that a transaction can be valid under one and
invalid under the other.”).
316

Id.

317

Id.

318

Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2003).

319

Grant Nyhammer, Physician Provided Physical Therapy Under Attack: South Carolina Rejects
Consensus In Sloan v. South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy Examiner, 20 NO. 3 HEALTH LAW.
17, n.281 (2008).
320
HCFA was renamed CMS in January of 2001. Harvey L. McCormick, MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROC. § 1:1, fen. 1 (4th ed.) (“The Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services . . . announced on June 14, 2001, the new name for the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA): The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)”).
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regulations of Stark II are published in the Code of Federal
Regulations at 42 C.F.R. §411.350 et. seq. CMS published
Phase III of the ﬁnal regulations of Stark II on September 5,
2007. 72 Fed. Reg. 51012- 51099 (2007).321
Stark II applies to a variety of designated health services
including
• clinical laboratory services;
• physical therapy services;
• occupational therapy services
• radiology or other diagnostic services;
• radiation therapy services;
• durable medical equipment;
• parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, or supplies;
• prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices;
• home health services;
• outpatient prescription drugs; and
• inpatient and outpatient hospital services.322
The anti-kickback statute323 “is a criminal statute that prohibits the knowing
and willful offer, solicitation, payment, or receipt of remuneration to induce or
reward the referral of any business payable by a federal health care program.”324 The
severity of the potential sanctions should cause this statue to be in the forefront
of the minds of every lawyer who represents HCWs or health care organizations
that receive federal funds. The issue is that “violation of the anti-kickback statute
is a crime, and the punishment carries a mandatory exclusion [from the program,
such as Medicare] along with other penalties.”325
The anti-kickback statute does “list[] eight exceptions to which the statutory
prohibitions against solicitation or receipt of remuneration in return for, or to
induce, referral of program-related beneﬁts under a federal health-care program
do not apply . . . .”326
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Nyhammer, supra note 319, at n.281.
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4 COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS § 57:199, Part VIII. Health Care Beneﬁts, Chapter 57.
Other Legal Issues Affecting Health Care Plans, XI. Fraud and Abuse in Health Care Transactions,
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Executives Might Pay More Attention to What They are Doing if They Knew They Could Be Held Liable,
10 NO. 2 J. HEALTH COMPLIANCE 55 (March-April 2008).
325

Id.

326
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The key for a lawyer is to watch for any arrangement that could be construed
as a referral or kickback. If such a thing exists, and the lawyer “knows” it, the
whistle-blowing provisions, discussed above,327 come into play.

5. Summary
A lawyer for a health care organization owes primary allegiance to the
organization, not the individuals, the constituents, who make up the organization
and with whom the lawyer interacts. When the actions or inactions of anyone,
even constituents, threaten the organization, the lawyer must blow the whistle. He
or she must act to protect the organization, even at the expense of the constituents
with whom the lawyer interacts.
A lawyer has some options. The lawyer may ask for reconsideration, for a
second legal opinion, or refer the matter to a higher, or even the highest, authority
in the organization. If that does not work, the lawyer may withdraw (withdrawal
will be required if the lawyer’s services will be used to perpetuate a crime or
fraud). Both before and after withdrawal, a lawyer owes a duty of conﬁdentiality
to the client. The lawyer may be permitted, however, to disclose both the fact of
withdrawal and at least some information about why withdrawal occurred. The
lawyer should neither withdraw nor disclose information, however, until after he
or she has advised the client of why the lawyer is proposing to withdraw, why, the
potential ramiﬁcations of withdrawal, and that before withdrawal, the client has
an opportunity to decide how to proceed in light of that information.
Because an organizational lawyer’s primary obligation is to the organization,
the lawyer must strive to keep the line between the client (the organization)
and its constituents (the individuals) clear. A lawyer who allows the line to blur,
and by whose conduct allows an implied attorney-client relationship with such
constituents to arise, may well face a conﬂict which cannot be waived. If that
occurs, the lawyer will be required to withdraw from representing the organization
and the constituents. Such a result will be a grave disservice to all clients, especially
the organization which hired the lawyer in the ﬁrst place, and to whom the lawyer
owed his or her primary loyalty.
Finally, the unique nature of the health professions, and the concomitant
receipt by most health care providers of federal funds, state funds, or both, imposes
special obligations on the providers and their lawyers to make sure that they do
not run afoul of federal law, state law, or both, thereby incurring civil liability,
criminal liability, or both.
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See supra notes 209–247 and accompanying text.
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